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iAbstract
In an online problem, information is revealed incrementally and decisions have to be made
before the full information is known. This occurs in various applications like, for example,
resource allocation or online ad assignment. To analyze the performance of algorithms for
online problems, it is classically assumed that there is a malicious adversary who always
provides the worst-possible input. This, however, is a very pessimistic assumption. There-
fore, in recent years, a lot of research has been done to analyze input models where the
power of the adversary is restricted.
In this thesis, we consider online optimization problems in the random-order model. In
this online model, an adversary specifies an input instance in advance but, in contrast to
the classic model, he may not determine the order in which it is revealed to the algorithm.
Instead, the input sequence is revealed in random order. We analyze several combinato-
rial generalizations of the famous secretary problem and present algorithms with improved
competitive ratios for each of them. Specifically, the problems considered here are of pack-
ing type, namely, bipartite matching, combinatorial auctions, generalized assignment and
packing linear programs.
First, we analyze the edge-weighted bipartite matching problem where the vertices of
one side arrive online in random order. For this problem, we give a surprisingly simple
algorithm that generalizes the classic algorithm for the secretary problem. Since its expected
competitive ratio matches the best-possible one for the secretary problem, the algorithm is
optimal. The result also gives the best-possible competitive ratio for the matroid secretary
problem on transversal matroids.
Then, we present improved competitive ratios for combinatorial auctions with online
bidders arriving in random order. They are generalizations of the weighted matching prob-
lem and we analyze various types of valuation functions. Namely, we consider auctions
where the bidders are interested in bundles of bounded or unbounded cardinality or where
the valuation functions are submodular.
For the online generalized assignment problem, which is another generalization of the
weighted matching problem, we present the first constant-competitive algorithm. This result
also improves on the best known competitive ratio for the online knapsack problem.
Finally, we consider online packing LPs where the variables are revealed online in ran-
dom order. For these, we present an algorithm that obtains the best-possible competitive
ratio on instances with high capacity ratio, i. e., where, for every row, the capacity is large
compared to the maximum entry in the constraint matrix. Furthermore, this algorithm also
gives close-to-optimal results when the capacity ratio is only bounded by a constant. Addi-
tionally, we show how to modify the algorithm in the presence of strategic agents to obtain
a truthful mechanism with almost identical competitive ratio.
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Zusammenfassung
Online-Probleme besitzen die Eigenschaft, dass Informationen erst nach und nach preis-
gegeben werden und Entscheidungen bereits gefa¨llt werden mu¨ssen, wa¨hrend zuku¨nftige
Informationen noch unbekannt sind. Diese sind in vielerlei Anwendungssituationen rele-
vant, wie zum Beispiel bei Ressourcenzuordnungsproblemen. Um die Gu¨te eines Algorith-
mus fu¨r derartige Probleme zu beweisen, geht man klassischerweise davon aus, dass der Al-
gorithmus gegen einen fiktiven bo¨swilligen Gegner arbeitet, welcher stets die ungu¨nstigste
Eingabe liefert. Diese Annahme ist jedoch sehr pessimistisch. In den letzten Jahren wurden
daher Eingabemodelle untersucht, bei denen der Gegner nur u¨ber eingeschra¨nkte Fa¨hig-
keiten verfu¨gt.
In dieser Arbeit werden Online-Optimierungsprobleme im Random-Order-Modell be-
trachtet. Bei diesem Eingabemodell spezifiziert der Gegner anfangs eine Eingabeinstanz. Im
Gegensatz zum klassischen Modell darf er jedoch nicht die Reihenfolge bestimmen, in wel-
cher diese dem Algorithmus pra¨sentiert wird. Stattdessen wird die Eingabesequenz in zufa¨l-
liger Reihenfolge offengelegt. Wir untersuchen mehrere kombinatorische Verallgemeinerun-
gen des Sekreta¨rinnenproblems und zeigen jeweils Algorithmen mit verbesserter Kompeti-
tivita¨t. Sa¨mtliche betrachteten Probleme sind Packprobleme. Dies sind im Speziellen bi-
partite Matchings, kombinatorische Auktionen, das Generalized-Assignment-Problem und
lineare Packprogramme.
Zuna¨chst untersuchen wir das Matchingproblem auf kantengewichteten Graphen, wenn
die Knoten der einen Seite online und in zufa¨lliger Reihenfolge aufgedeckt werden. Hier-
fu¨r stellen wir einen u¨berraschend einfachen Algorithmus vor, der den klassischen Algo-
rithmus fu¨r das Sekreta¨rinnenproblem verallgemeinert. Da seine erwartete Gu¨te mit der
bestmo¨glichen Kompetitivita¨t fu¨r das Sekreta¨rinnenproblem u¨bereinstimmt, ist dieser Algo-
rithmus optimal. Zusa¨tzlich liefert dieser Algorithmus auch das bestmo¨gliche Resultat fu¨r
das Matroid-Sekreta¨rinnenproblem auf transversalen Matroiden.
Anschließend zeigen wir verbesserte Gu¨tegarantien fu¨r kombinatorische Auktionen, bei
denen die Bieter online und in zufa¨lliger Reihenfolge erscheinen. Dies sind Verallgemeiner-
ungen des kantengewichteten Matching-Problems und wir betrachten verschiedene Typen
von Bewertungsfunktionen. Insbesondere betrachten wir Auktionen, bei denen die Bieter an
Bu¨ndeln beschra¨nkter bzw. unbeschra¨nkter Gro¨ße interessiert sind oder ihre Bewertungs-
funktionen submodular sind.
Fu¨r das Generalized-Assignment-Problem, das eine andere Verallgemeinerung des ge-
wichteten Matching-Problems ist, stellen wir den ersten Algorithmus mit konstanter Kom-
petitivita¨t vor. Dieses Resultat verbessert auch die beste bekannte Gu¨tegarantie fu¨r das
Online-Rucksackproblem.
Abschließend betrachten wir Online-Packprogramme, bei denen die Variablen in zufa¨l-
iv
liger Reihenfolge offengelegt werden. Wir stellen einen Algorithmus vor, welcher auf In-
stanzen mit hohem Kapazita¨tsverha¨ltnis die bestmo¨gliche Gu¨te erreicht. Bei derartigen In-
stanzen ist in jeder Zeile des linearen Programms die Kapazita¨t groß gegenu¨ber dem maxi-
malen Matrixeintrag. Außerdem verha¨lt sich der Algorithmus auch nahezu optimal, wenn
das Kapazita¨tsverha¨ltnis nur konstant beschra¨nkt ist. Zuletzt zeigen wir, wie man, im Falle
von strategisch agierenden Agenten, den Algorithmus zu einem anreizkompatiblen Mecha-
nismus mit nahezu identischer Gu¨te umformen kann.
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1CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Nowadays, combinatorial optimization problems occur in many situations, be it the task of
finding the shortest route to get from home to work or the problem of assigning workers to
clients in a cost-efficient way. Particularly in business settings, optimization problems have
to be solved on a daily basis. Formally, in a combinatorial optimization problem, there is
an objective function over a finite set of feasible solutions and the task is to find an optimal
one. To name a more specific example, consider a truck driver in a logistics company who
decides on how to load his vehicle. Assume that the packages he has to transport have
different sizes and values. On the given day, he can only do a single trip but the truck is too
small to carry all goods. In this case, his task is to select a subset of the various packages
such that they fit into the truck and their total valuation is maximized. Similar problems
appear in many applications where requests have to be assigned to resources under specific
constraints. The goal of algorithmic research is to provide efficient algorithms that solve
these problems optimally or approximately with provable performance guarantees.
Classically, an algorithm is perceived as an entity that first receives an input, then pro-
cesses on this data, and finally returns an output. Such algorithms are called offline. How-
ever, the assumption of knowing the complete input data at the very beginning of the process
is unrealistic for many practical applications. Requests often appear one after the other in
a serial fashion and decisions on what to do with each one have to be made immediately
and irrevocably. In the case of the truck driver, for example, the packages might come on
a conveyor belt and he has to decide whether to pack or reject an item before he sees the
next one. These scenarios are called online and have additional intrinsic difficulties. When
making a decision it is not known which other options will come in the future. Furthermore,
every decision influences later ones. In the case of the truck driver, there may appear an ex-
tremely valuable package during the loading process which he cannot take since it exceeds
the remaining capacity of the truck. Now, if it is not possible to revoke previous decisions,
he has to face the consequences and reject the valuable package. Trivially, had he known all
the input data in advance, he might have come up with a far better solution.
The study of online optimization was initiated by Sleater and Tarjan [ST85]. They con-
sidered problems where the input is revealed in a sequence of steps and, after each step, the
algorithm has to take an immediate and irrevocable decision based on previous inputs. The
difficulty arises from the facts that the algorithm has no knowledge about forthcoming re-
quests and earlier decisions cannot be undone. To measure the quality of online algorithms,
they introduced competitive analysis, which has become a standard notion. According to
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them, an online algorithm is called α-competitive if, for all possible input sequences, the out-
put computed by the algorithm is at most a factor of α worse than the output of an optimal
offline algorithm that knows the complete input in advance. This, by definition, is a worst-
case measure since it must hold for all request sequences.
It is common to think about online problems as a kind of game between the algorithm
on the one hand and a malicious adversary on the other hand. In every step, the adver-
sary provides the worst possible input and thus tries to coax the algorithm into performing
badly. Observe that, if the online algorithm is deterministic, then the adversary can com-
pletely predict the algorithm’s behavior, so it can even generate a bad input instance in ad-
vance. If, however, the algorithm is allowed to use randomization, then it is possible to
obtain better competitive ratios, since the algorithm’s behavior becomes less predictable. In
this setting, an online algorithm is called α-competitive in expectation if the expected value of
the output is at most a factor of α worse than that of an optimal offline algorithm. For ran-
domized online algorithms, different types of adversaries have been considered to analyze
their performance. The weakest one, which therefore admits the best competitive ratios, is
the oblivious adversary. Such an adversary has to specify an input sequence in advance and
can hereby only rely on the knowledge of the randomized algorithm’s source code. This is
analogous to the deterministic case where the instance is also given at the beginning. An
oblivious adversary, however, does not know the outcomes of the random coin flips during
the execution. Other adversaries may even adapt their requests to the decisions of the algo-
rithm. Hence, they are considerably stronger. It is important to note that, in the classic online
model, the adversary determines the order in which the online requests are revealed to the
algorithm. Therefore, it is also called adversarial-order model. More information on classic
online algorithms can be found in the book by Borodin and El-Yaniv [BEY98].
A general point of criticism concerning the classical online models is that they are overly
pessimistic. Although online problems appear in many situations, in practice, the patho-
logical input instances, like those generated by adversaries, almost never occur. To obtain
more realistic results, it is therefore necessary to consider online models where the adver-
sary is not as powerful as in the classic theory. Furthermore, for a lot of natural online
problems the adversarial-order model is far too restrictive in the sense that these problems
have unbounded competitive ratios. That is, even against an oblivious adversary any online
algorithm performs arbitrarily bad.
In this thesis, we consider online problems in the random-order model. In that model, the
malicious adversary specifies an input instance in advance but he may not determine the
order in which the requests are presented to the algorithm. Instead, they come in random
order, i. e., they appear according to a permutation which is chosen uniformly at random
among all permutations. It is additionally assumed that the length of the input sequence is
known to the algorithm in advance.
More specifically, for maximization problems the competitive ratio in the random-order
model is defined as follows. Let ALG be a, possibly randomized, online algorithm for the
considered problem and OPT an optimal offline algorithm for it. Given an instance I , we
denote by ALG(I) and OPT(I) the values obtained by ALG and OPT, respectively. The
algorithm ALG is said to be α-competitive in expectation if, for all possible instances, we have
E [ALG(I)] ≥ α ·OPT(I) ,
where the expectation is over the random order and, possibly, the randomness in the online
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algorithm. By definition, we have α ∈ [0, 1] and the larger the ratio the better the algorithm.
Observe that, in the random-order model, the adversary is far weaker than in all of the
classic online models. An oblivious adversary has to specify an input sequence in advance
and can determine the order in which it is revealed. Here, however, it is highly unlikely that
an instance is presented to the algorithm in the order that the adversary conceived.
The prototypical problem that originally motivated the study of online optimization in
the random-order model is the secretary problem: Imagine an administrator who wants to hire
a new secretary. For this reason, she does job interviews where the candidates arrive one by
one in random order. The total number of candidates is initially known. In every interview,
the administrator learns the qualification score of the current applicant for the available job,
i. e., she learns a single non-negative value for every applicant. Then, right after each inter-
view, she has to decide whether to take the current candidate or to reject him for good. If she
accepts a candidate, this decision is irrevocable and she cannot take any later one. More ab-
stractly, there is a prespecified number of non-negative values that appear online in random
order and at most one of them can be selected. In terms of competitive analysis the objective
is to maximize the expected qualification score of the accepted candidate compared to the
value of the optimal one.
A well-known and simple algorithm for the secretary problem due to Lindley [Lin61] and
Dynkin [Dyn63] is 1e -competitive in expectation. It was also shown that this result is optimal,
i. e., no online algorithm, even randomized, can do better. Since the secretary problem builds
the foundation of our work, we will give more details in Chapter 2.
Note that the secretary problem is obviously trivial when considered offline, i. e., when
all values are initially known. However, when the candidates appear in adversarial order,
every online algorithm, even randomized, behaves arbitrarily bad as was formally shown
by Aggarwal et al. [AGKM11]. The secretary problem is defined in the random-order model
and admits a constant competitive ratio. This illustrates that there are online problems that
belong to an intermediate setting and that the random-order model is a very natural candi-
date for the analysis of online problems with a weakened adversary.
1.1 Problems and Results
In this thesis, we study a number of online problems in the random-order model, which
are all generalizations of the secretary problem. Our algorithms always return integral solu-
tions and – unless indicated otherwise – the competitive ratios even hold with respect to the
fractional optimum of an LP relaxation. An overview of the interrelation of the considered
problems can be seen in Figure 1.1. The figure also summarizes the presented results.
Matchings The first problem, which is considered in Chapter 3, is the edge-weighted bipar-
tite matching problem. It is a combinatorial generalization of the secretary problem where
the administrator has to staff not only one but several different jobs. Again, the n candidates
appear online in random order and, whenever an applicant arrives, we learn his qualifica-
tion scores for the various jobs. Therefore, we receive a tuple of non-negative values where
each value indicates his qualification for the respective job. Now, after each interview, the
task of the administrator is twofold. She has to decide whether to take the current candidate
and, if she does, she also has to assign him directly and irrevocably to one of the jobs. Her
objective is to maximize the expected sum of qualifications of the assigned candidates.
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In graph-theoretic terms, the objective is to find a maximum-weight matching in an edge-
weighted bipartite graph. The vertices on the right-hand side are initially known together
with the total number of vertices on the left-hand side n. Then, the vertices on the left-hand
side appear online in random order. Whenever an online vertex arrives, its incident edges
along with their weights are revealed. In each such iteration, the online algorithm has to
decide whether to add one of the current edges to the matching. Note that the vertices on
the right, i. e., the offline side, correspond to the jobs and the vertices on the left, i. e., the
online side, correspond to the candidates.
In Chapter 3, we present the first algorithm for this problem which is 1e -competitive in
expectation. Interestingly, it is surprisingly simple. Furthermore, when applied to the sec-
retary problem, our algorithm turns out to behave identically to the classic algorithm for it.
Since an upper bound of 1e is known for the competitiveness of the secretary problem, our
algorithm is optimal. Additionally, our algorithm also gives the best-possible competitive
ratio for the matroid secretary problem on transversal matroids, which is a special case of
the edge-weighted matching problem.
Combinatorial Auctions In Chapter 4, we generalize the results on edge-weighted bipar-
tite matchings to combinatorial auctions. In that problem there is a set of items and a set of
bidders. The bidders have non-negative valuations for subsets, or bundles, of items. That
is, each bidder specifies the sets that she is interested in along with her respective valuations
for each of these sets. The objective is to assign disjoint subsets of the items to the bidders
such that the social welfare, i. e., the sum of the bidders’ valuations for their respective al-
located sets, is maximized. Here, we assume that the items and the number of bidders are
initially known while the bidders arrive online in random order. Whenever an online bidder
appears, she reveals her valuations for the sets she is interested in and the algorithm has to
decide whether to assign one of these bundles to her permanently. Observe that the edge-
weighted bipartite matching problem corresponds to the special case where the bidders are
exclusively interested in single items, i. e., bundles of cardinality one.
We study several scenarios. First, we consider the case that the bidders are only inter-
ested in sets of bounded cardinality. For this, we give an algorithm that is 1e·d -competitive in
expectation, where d denotes the maximal cardinality of the bundles. This almost matches
the complexity-theoretic upper bound of O
( log d
d
)
by Hazan et al. [HSS06]. To complement
this, we give an additional upper bound and show that in the online setting every algo-
rithm, even with unbounded computational power, can be at most O
( log log d
log d
)
-competitive
in expectation. It is reasonable to assume that the problem becomes easier if the items are
available multiple times since in that case, an earlier decision has less severe consequences
on later ones. We can confirm this assumption and present an algorithm that is Ω
( 1
d1/b
)
-
competitive in expectation, when every item has multiplicity at least b and d is the maximal
cardinality of the bundles. If the bidders are interested in sets of unbounded cardinality, we
can modify the techniques to obtain an algorithm which is Ω
( 1
m1/(b+1)
)
-competitive in expec-
tation, where m is the total number of different items and each of these is available at least
b times. This also matches the complexity-theoretic upper bound, see Nisan in [NRTV07].
Observe that the above results do not make any additional assumptions on the bidders’ val-
uation functions apart from non-negativity and (in some cases) bounded bundle sizes. In
many economical applications, however, the valuations exhibit particular structures which
can be exploited. Therefore, we also consider monotone submodular valuation functions
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and present an algorithm which is 1e -competitive in expectation, independent of the item
multiplicities.
Generalized Assignments In Chapter 5, we consider the generalized assignment problem.
In this problem, there is a set of resources, each with a specific non-negative capacity, and
a set of requests that have to be assigned to the resources. The resources and their capac-
ities are initially known while the requests appear online in random order. Whenever a
request arrives, it specifies to which resources it can possibly be assigned and, for each of
these options, it gives two non-negative values. One value indicates the amount of capacity
consumption and the other one the profit when assigning the request to the respective re-
source. Every online request can be assigned to one of its incident resources in which case
it consumes the specified amount from that resource’s remaining capacity and obtains the
corresponding profit. That is, each request may be allocated at most once but we may assign
more than one request to a resource as long as their aggregated consumptions do not exceed
the resource’s capacity. The objective is to find a profit-maximizing assignment subject to the
capacity constraints. An instance of the generalized assignment problem can be pictured as
a bipartite graph where the capacitated resources correspond to the vertices on the one side
and the online requests to the vertices on the other side. The edges represent the possible
options of assigning a request.
Many special cases of the generalized assignment problem are classical optimization
problems. First, when all capacities and all resource consumptions are equal, at most one
request can be assigned to every resource. In this case, we obtain the edge-weighted bipar-
tite matching problem. Second, if there is only a single resource, every request has only one
weight value and one profit value. This situation is identical to the knapsack problem. Ob-
serve that the truck-loading example in the introduction is nothing else than the online knap-
sack problem if we assume that there is only a single packing constraint for the packages.
Third, when the resource consumption of every option is identical to its respective profit, the
problem is known as the AdWords problem which has its motivation in the assignment of
internet search queries to advertisers. Note that the edge-weighted bipartite matching prob-
lem and the AdWords problem are themselves generalizations of the unweighted bipartite
matching problem where the task is to find a matching of maximum cardinality.
We present an algorithm for the generalized assignment problem in the random-order
model which is 18.1 -competitive in expectation. To the best of our knowledge, the problem
has never been considered in this model before. Furthermore, our result also improves the
best-known competitive ratio for the knapsack problem in the random-order model.
Packing Linear Programs Finally, in Chapter 6, we consider all online problems that can
be described in the following abstract way. There is a set of resources, each with its specific
non-negative capacity, and a set of requests that appear online. Each request can possibly be
served in different ways, which we call options. Any option of a request raises a specified
non-negative profit but it also consumes specified non-negative amounts from each of the
various resources’ capacities. In contrast to the generalized assignment problem, an option
of a request does not necessarily consume capacity from only a single resource but possibly
from many resources. To serve an online request at most one of its options may be selected.
The objective is to decide for every request whether and how to serve it in order to maximize
the total profit while not exceeding the resource capacities.
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In terms of linear programming these are packing linear programs (LPs), i. e., maximiza-
tion LPs with “less or equal”-constraints where every entry is non-negative and also the
solution vector is bound to be non-negative. The constraints of the linear program corre-
spond to the resources and, initially, we are given the capacity of every constraint. When-
ever an online request arrives, some variables, i. e., some columns of the constraint matrix
along with their respective coefficients in the objective function are revealed. These columns
are the possible options of the request and their entries in the constraint matrix specify the
respective resource consumptions. The algorithm then has to decide whether to select one
of the current columns, i. e., it has to fix the corresponding integer variables and may set at
most one of them to one.
It can easily be observed that packing LPs generalize all previously considered prob-
lems. In combinatorial auctions, for example, the rows correspond to the items and their
capacity entries are the item multiplicities. Every request, i. e., every online bidder, comes
with a number of columns that correspond to the sets that the bidder is interested in. More
specifically, the revealed columns contain the incidence vectors of the sets and the respective
coefficients in the objective function are the valuations for them. Observe that in this case,
the constraint matrix is a 0/1-matrix. When modeling the generalized assignment prob-
lem, the capacity vector again reflects the capacities of the resources. Here, a request comes
with a column for every resource that it can be assigned to. Each such column has a single
non-zero entry in the respective row specifying its resource consumption and, of course, the
corresponding profit value in the objective function.
To characterize input instances, we will use the following two notions. First, we say that
a linear program has column sparsity d if every column has at most d non-zero entries. This
is naturally bounded by the total number of rows m, i. e., d ≤ m. Second, we need to specify
by how much the resource capacities are larger than the resource consumptions. We say that
an instance has capacity ratio B if, for every row, the entry in the capacity vector is at least a
factor of B larger than the largest matrix entry in that row. Intuitively, a large capacity ratio
should favorably affect the competitive ratio since the consequences of a bad online decision
are smaller.
We present a simple algorithm for online packing LPs in the random-order model and
show that it is
(
1 − O(√log(d)/B))-competitive in expectation1. In other words, the algo-
rithm is (1 − e)-competitive when the capacity ratio satisfies B = Ω( log d
e2
)
. This result is
optimal since it matches the known lower bounds by Agrawal et al. [AWY09] for d = m
and by Kleinberg [Kle05] for m = 1. Observe, however, that the given competitive ratio is
only meaningful for large capacity ratios. We therefore show that the identical algorithm
also behaves favorably if the capacity ratio is small. Specifically, for B ≥ 2 it is Ω( 1
d2/(B−1)
)
-
competitive in expectation. Interestingly, and in contrast to other previous results, our algo-
rithm is very robust. It does not need to know the column sparsity or the capacity ratio in
advance. If, however, the column sparsity and the capacity ratio are known to the algorithm,
it can be trimmed to be Ω
( 1
d1/(B−1)
)
-competitive in expectation. Finally, we show how to cope
with strategic agents. In some applications, the requests might misreport their true objec-
tive function if this leads to a favorable outcome for them. We show how to use monetary
charges such that it is in the best interest of every request to report their valuations truth-
fully. In that case, the mechanism is
(
1−O(√log(m)/B))-competitive in expectation for large
capacity ratios and Ω
( 1
m2/(B−1)
)
-competitive in expectation for B ≥ 2.
1We follow the convention of using log(x) to denote max{log(x), 1} in asymptotic statements.
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Secretary Problem
. 1e -comp. [Lin61, Dyn63]
Unweighted Matching
. 0.696-comp. [MY11]
Edge-Weighted Matching
. 1e -comp. (*)
Knapsack
. 18.1 -comp. (*)
AdWords
. 12 -comp. [LLN06]
Generalized Assignment Problem
. 18.1 -comp. (*)
Combinatorial Auctions
general valuations
min. item multiplicity b
. Ω
( 1
m1/(b+1)
)
-comp. (*)
Comb. Auctions
bundle sizes ≤ d
min. item multiplicity b
. Ω
( 1
d1/b
)
-comp. (*)
Comb. Auctions
bundle sizes ≤ d
no multiplicities
. 1e·d -comp. (*)
Comb. Auctions
submodular valuations
. 1e -comp. (*)
Packing Linear Programs (*)
column sparsity d
capacity ratio B
. (1− e)-comp. for B = Ω( log d
e2
)
. Ω
( 1
d2/(B−1)
)
-comp. for B ≥ 2
. Ω
( 1
d1/(B−1)
)
-comp. for known B ≥ 2 and d
. truthful (1− e)-comp. for B = Ω( log m
e2
)
. truthful Ω
( 1
m2/(B−1)
)
-comp. for B ≥ 2
Figure 1.1: Interrelations of the mentioned problems and the best-known competitive ratios
in the random-order model. The results marked with (*) are presented in this thesis.
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1.2 Related Work
There exists an enormous body of work on online optimization. Therefore, we restrict the
considerations to those results that are related to problems and models in this thesis.
Secretary Problem and Matroid Secretary Problem The secretary problem was first pub-
lished by Gardner [Gar60] and solutions were given by Lindley [Lin61] and Dynkin [Dyn63].
Unfortunately, the origins of this folkloric problem are unclear, as described in more detail
by Ferguson [Fer89] and Freeman [Fre83]. If up to k secretaries can be selected, there is an
optimal (1−O(√1/k))-competitive algorithm by Kleinberg [Kle05].
Babaioff et al. [BIK07] introduced the matroid secretary problem which is a combinatorial
generalization where the elements of a matroid appear online in random order. They gave
an Ω
( 1
log ρ
)
-competitive algorithm for general matroids, where ρ is the rank of the matroid.
This was later improved to Ω
(
1/
√
log ρ
)
by Chakraborty and Lachish [CL12] and then to
Ω
( 1
log log ρ
)
by Lachish [Lac14] and Feldman et al. [FSZ14]. Various constant-competitive
results are known for special kinds of matroids, see [BIK07, DK13, DP12, IW11, JSZ13, Kle05,
KP09, MTW13, Sot13]. A comprehensive survey on matroid secretary problems is given by
Dinitz [Din13].
Matchings The edge-weighted bipartite matching problem in the random-order model
was first considered by Korula and Pa´l [KP09]. Their algorithm is 18 -competitive in expec-
tation and was a major inspiration for our work. Previously, there were some results for
the matroid secretary problem on transversal matroids, which is the special case where all
edges of an online vertex have the same weight. Namely, Babaioff et al. [BIK07] gave a 14d -
competitive algorithm when the online vertices have bounded degree d and Dimitrov and
Plaxton [DP12] presented a 116 -competitive algorithm for general transversal matroids. We
improve on all of these in Chapter 3.
A formal proof that every (even randomized) algorithm for bipartite matching with gen-
eral edge-weights has unbounded competitive ratio when the vertices arrive in adversarial
order was given by Aggarwal et al. [AGKM11]. This negative result also holds for the secre-
tary problem.
In the unweighted case, however, the online bipartite matching problem admits positive
results in various models. The simple greedy algorithm that matches every online vertex
to an arbitrary unmatched vertex is 12 -competitive and this is optimal in the deterministic
setting. Karp et al. [KVV90] presented a randomized algorithm which is (1− 1e )-competitive
in expectation for adversarial order and also gave a matching upper bound. The proof of
this classic result was later simplified by Goel and Mehta [GM08] and Birnbaum and Math-
ieu [BM08]. A primal-dual analysis was given by Devanur et al. [DJK13]. Aggarwal et
al. [AGKM11] extended these results to bipartite graphs with vertex weights on the offline
side and obtained the same competitive ratio. In the random-order model the results for
unweighted matching can even be improved. Goel and Mehta [GM08] showed that for ran-
dom arrival even the greedy algorithm is (1− 1e )-competitive in expectation. Mahdian and
Yan [MY11] showed that the ranking algorithm by Karp et al. [KVV90] beats the barrier of
1− 1e when considered in the random-order model and obtained a competitive ratio of 0.696
(a factor of 0.653 was obtained by Karande et al. [KMT11]). Goel and Mehta [GM08] also
provided upper bounds for matching with random arrival and showed that no determinis-
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tic algorithm can be better than 34 -competitive and no randomized algorithm can be better
than 56 -competitive.
In the offline setting, the edge-weighted bipartite matching problem is one of the classic
combinatorial optimization problems and is also known as the assignment problem. The
famous Hungarian method by Kuhn [Kuh55] and Munkres [Mun57] solves it optimally
in polynomial time and is based on ideas from the Hungarian mathematicians Ko˝nig and
Egerva´ry.
Combinatorial Auctions Combinatorial auctions with bidders arriving in random order
have first been considered by Korula and Pa´l [KP09]. They presented an Ω
( 1
d2
)
-competitive
algorithm for bundles of bounded cardinality d and item multiplicity b = 1. Krysta and
Vo¨cking [KV12] developed truthful mechanisms for the random-order online setting. For
bundles of cardinality at most d, they obtained an Ω
( 1
d1/b·log(bm)
)
-competitive mechanism,
where m is the number of different items and b their multiplicity. For general valuations their
mechanism is Ω
( 1
m1/(b+1)·log(bm)
)
-competitive. Additionally, they showed a competitive ratio
ofΩ
( 1
log m
)
for XOS-valuations, which also contain submodular valuations. An upper bound
of O
( 1
b·d1/b
)
for any deterministic set packing algorithm in the adversarial online model was
given by Azar and Regev [AR06].
Offline, and ignoring incentive issues, the best approximation ratios for combinatorial
auctions with bundles of bounded size are obtained by the results on packing integer lin-
ear programs (ILPs) with d-sparse columns from Bansal et al. [BKNS12]. For item mul-
tiplicity b, their results give an Ω( 1
d1/b
)-approximation and for item multiplicity one they
obtain an approximation ratio of 1e·d+o(d) . A complexity theoretic upper bound on set pack-
ing with sets of size d was given by Hazan et al. [HSS06] who showed that the maximum
set packing problem is O
( ln d
d
)
-hard to approximate. For general valuations on bundles of
unbounded size and item multiplicity one, there is a complexity theoretic upper bound of
O
( 1
m1/(b+1)
)
, see the article by Blumrosen and Nisan in [NRTV07]. For monotone submodular
valuations, the greedy algorithm by Lehmann et al. [LLN06] is 12 -approximate and the best
known approximation ratio is 1− 1e + e, in expectation, for some constant e > 0 by Feige
and Vondra´k [FV10].
Generalized Assignments To the best of our knowledge, the generalized assignment prob-
lem has never been considered in the random-order online model. Offline, the best-known
approximation factor is 1− 1e + e for some constant e > 0 by Feige and Vondra´k [FV06]. This
improved on a (1− 1e )-approximation by Fleischer et al. [FGMS11]. Since, in the adversarial
model, every online algorithm has unbounded competitive ratio, only special cases of the
generalized assignment problem were investigated online. These are matchings (see above),
the knapsack problem and the AdWords problem.
The knapsack problem, i. e., the special case with a single resource, has been considered
by Babaioff et al. [BIKK07] who obtained a 110e -competitive algorithm in the random-order
model. Our result for the generalized assignment problem improves on this.
The AdWords problem, i. e., the special case where for every option the resource con-
sumption and the profit are equal, was introduced by Mehta et al. [MSVV07]. In this prob-
lem, it is generally assumed that the capacity constraints are soft, i. e., they may be ex-
ceeded by the assigned requests but they still bound the maximal contribution to the ob-
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jective function. Additionally, it is often assumed that the resource consumptions are very
small with respect to the capacities. Mehta et al. [MSVV07] presented an optimal (1− 1e )-
competitive algorithm in the adversarial model under the above assumptions. The same re-
sult was obtained by Buchbinder et al. [BJN07] with a primal-dual analysis. For the random-
order model Goel and Mehta [GM08] showed that even the greedy algorithm is (1 − 1e )-
competitive in expectation and Devanur and Hayes [DH09] presented a (1− e)-competitive
algorithm under further assumptions on large capacities. When the resource consumptions
are not small with respect to the capacities, the competitive ratios are much weaker. The
only known result is a greedy algorithm which is 12 -competitive [LLN06] in the adversarial
and in the random-order model.
Packing Linear Programs Buchbinder and Naor [BN09] initiated the study of online pack-
ing LPs in the adversarial online model where the columns appear one after the other.
They presented an optimal primal-dual based algorithm that obtains a competitive ratio
of Ω
( 1
log m+log maxi∈[m] ai(max)/ai(min)
)
. Here, m is the number of rows and ai(max) and ai(min)
are the largest and the smallest, respectively, non-zero entry in constraint i. The columns,
however, are assumed to be scaled with respect to the coefficients in the objective function,
i. e., ai(max) := maxj∈[n]
{ ai,j
cj
}
and ai(min) := minj∈[n]
{ ai,j
cj
| ai,j 6= 0
}
.
In the random-order model, several (1− e)-competitive algorithms have been presented
for online packing LPs under various assumptions on the instance. These algorithms gen-
erally assume that the capacity ratio is large and that it is initially known to the algorithm.
The first results already allowed up to K optional columns in every online step and were
independently presented by Feldman et al. [FHK+10] and by Agrawal et al. [AWY09]. The
algorithm by Feldman et al. is (1− e)-competitive in expectation when B = Ω(m log (nK)
e3
)
and OPT = Ω
( cmaxm log (nK)
e
)
, where cmax is the largest entry in the objective function vector.
Agrawal et al. needed the assumption B = Ω
(m log (nK/e)
e2
)
or OPT = Ω
( cmaxm2 log (n/e)
e2
)
. Ad-
ditionally, the second paper provided a lower bound on the capacity ratio. They showed
that to obtain a (1− e)-competitive algorithm the capacity ratio B necessarily has to satisfy
B = Ω
( log m
e2
)
. This bound is matched by the results presented in this thesis. Later, Molinaro
and Ravi [MR12] presented a (1− e)-competitive algorithm assuming B = Ω(m2 log (m/e)
e2
)
and
thus removed the dependence on the number of requests n. Online packing LPs have also
been analyzed in a stochastic online model by Devanur et al. [DJSW11]. However, as pointed
out by Molinaro and Ravi [MR12], this model is significantly weaker than the random-order
model. Devanur et al. gave a (1− e)-competitive algorithm when B = Ω( log (m/e)
e2
)
and also
showed a lower bound of B = Ω
( log m
e2
)
. All of the above mentioned algorithms are primal-
dual based and need to know the capacity ratio in advance. In contrast to this, our algorithm
is primal-based, relatively simple and it does neither need the capacity ratio nor the column
sparsity as an input.
Offline packing ILPs with sparse columns were investigated by Bansal et al. [BKNS12].
For column sparsity d they presented a 1e·d+o(d) -approximate randomized algorithm and
hereby improved on theΩ
( 1
d2
)
-approximate algorithm by Pritchard and Chakrabarty [PC11].
For larger capacity ratios B, Bansal et al. also presented an Ω( 1
d1/bBc
)-approximation algo-
rithm.
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CHAPTER 2
Review of the Secretary Problem
The secretary problem is the fundamental problem in the systematic study of online opti-
mization in the random-order model. Here, an instance is generated by an adversary but
he may not specify the order in which the input is presented to the algorithm. Instead, the
input sequence is revealed in random order. All settings considered in this thesis are gen-
eralizations of this strikingly simple problem. Therefore, we start by reviewing some of the
well-known results. In particular, we consider the classic algorithm which is 1e -competitive
in expectation and we also recapitulate an upper bound that proves its optimality.
In the secretary problem, as shortly introduced before, an administrator wants to hire a
new employee for a vacant job. Therefore, she does job interviews with the possible candi-
dates. The set of candidates is denoted by C and they arrive one by one in random order.
Initially, she only knows the total number of applicants to come, which is denoted by n. In
every interview, the administrator learns the qualification of the current candidate for the
job, that is, when interviewing candidate c she learns a non-negative number w(c) ∈ R≥0.1
Then, right after every interview, she has to make an immediate and irrevocable decision
whether to accept the current applicant or to reject him for good. Note that at this moment,
she does not know the qualifications of the remaining candidates that she has not seen so
far. More abstractly, there are n non-negative numbers that arrive online in random order
and at most one of these numbers may be selected.
In the classic formulation of the secretary problem, the objective is to maximize the proba-
bility of choosing the best among all candidates. Formally, when c∗ := argmaxc∈Cw(c) is the
most qualified candidate, the algorithm should maximize the probability Pr [c∗ is selected].
Since the common notion in online optimization is competitive analysis, we are rather in-
terested in maximizing the competitive ratio. That is, we want to maximize the expected
value of the accepted candidate E [w(accepted cand.)] compared to the value of the optimal
candidate w(c∗). These two objectives turn out to be identical.
Observe that the secretary problem is obviously trivial when considered offline. If the
candidates appear in adversarial order, however, every online algorithm, even random-
ized, behaves arbitrarily bad as was formally shown by Aggarwal et al. [AGKM11]. In the
random-order model, which is an intermediate model, the secretary problem admits a con-
stant competitive ratio.
1Without loss of generality we assume that there are no ties.
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2.1 Classic Approach
The well-known algorithm for the secretary problem is based on a very intuitive idea. It
first screens the market to get some statistical data and then makes a decision based on this
information.
More specifically, it rejects the first b ne c applicants but remembers the qualification of the
best candidate in this sample set as a threshold value. Subsequently, the interview process is
continued and the algorithm rejects all candidates until one arrives that beats the threshold.
This candidate is irrevocably accepted and no later applicants can be taken.
The above strategy is formalized in Algorithm 1. The classic analysis that we present in
Theorem 2.1 shows that the globally best candidate is selected with probability at least 1e .
Algorithm 1: Secretary Problem – classic version
Input : number of candidates n = |C|
Output: a candidate c˜
Let C′ ⊂ C be the first b ne c randomly arriving candidates;
Let T := maxc∈C′ w(c) be the qualification of the best candidate in the sample;
for every arriving candidate c ∈ C \ C′ do // interviews i = d ne e to n
Set C′ := C′ ∪ {c} and i := |C′|;
if w(c) > T and the job is still available then
Accept c permanently;
Theorem 2.1 ([Lin61, Dyn63]). Let c∗ := argmaxc∈Cw(c) be the best among all candidates in C.
Then, for large n, Algorithm 1 satisfies
Pr [c∗ is selected] ≥ 1
e
.
Proof. Since c∗ may appear in any of the n rounds but the algorithm rejects the first b ne c
candidates, we have
Pr [c∗ is selected] =
n
∑
i=d ne e
Pr [c∗ comes in i-th round and we accept in i-th round] .
The probability for c∗ to arrive at the i-th interview is 1n as the candidates come in random
order. Conditioned on this, the algorithm accepts c∗ if no other previous candidate could
beat the threshold T. That is, if the best among the previous i − 1 candidates appeared
within the b ne c initial interviews. Due to the random order of arrivals, this happens with
probability bn/eci−1 . Hence, we have
Pr [c∗ is selected] =
n
∑
i=d ne e
1
n
· b
n
e c
i− 1
=
b ne c
n
·
n−1
∑
i=b ne c
1
i
≥
(
1
e
− 1
n
)
· ln
(
n
b ne c
)
≥
(
1
e
− 1
n
)
.
Here, we bounded the harmonic sum by its lower integral ∑n−1i=bn/ec
1
i ≥
∫ n
bn/ec
1
x dx = ln(
n
bn/ec ).
So the lower bound on the probability of choosing the best candidate converges to 1e as n
tends to infinity.
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The above result can be used to show the expected competitiveness of the algorithm.
Corollary 2.2. Let c∗ := argmaxc∈Cw(c) be the best among all candidates in C. Then, for large n,
the weight of the candidate selected by Algorithm 1 satisfies
E [w(selected candidate)] ≥ 1
e
· w(c∗) .
That is, Algorithm 1 is 1e -competitive in expectation.
Proof. By the definition of the expectation and applying Theorem 2.1 in the last step, we have
E [w(selected candidate)] = ∑
c∈C
Pr [c is selected] · w(c)
≥ Pr [c∗ is selected] · w(c∗)
≥ 1
e
· w(c∗) .
2.2 Upper Bound
The competitive ratio that we obtained in the previous section is indeed the best possible.
This was already known since the works of Lindley [Lin61] and Dynkin [Dyn63]. Here, we
give another proof that is due to Buchbinder, Jain and Singh [BJS10]. It is very illustrative as
they showed that all possible (even randomized) algorithms for the secretary problem can
be described by a linear program and then used LP duality to bound the optimal factor.
Theorem 2.3 ([Lin61, Dyn63, BJS10]). No algorithm for the secretary problem, even randomized,
accepts the best candidate in C with a probability larger than 1e .
Proof. Fix an arbitrary randomized algorithm for the secretary problem and consider the
probabilities that the algorithm chooses a candidate in a specific round. We denote pi =
Pr [candidate in interview i is accepted] where the probability is over the randomization in
the order of the input and the randomization in the algorithm.
Observe that without loss of generality we can assume that the algorithm only accepts
an online candidate if it is the best among the ones seen so far. Otherwise the current
candidate cannot be the best one globally. That is, we actually consider the values pi =
Pr [candidate in interview i is better than previous ones and accepted].
Now consider any interview i where the current candidate is c and let C′ be the set of
interviewed candidates at that times. By the above assumption and since c has probability 1i
of being the best in C′, we have
pi = Pr
[
c accepted in interview i
∣∣ c is best in C′] · Pr [c is best in C′]
≤ Pr [all candidates in interviews 1 to i− 1 rejected ∣∣ c is best in C′] · 1
i
= Pr [all candidates in interviews 1 to i− 1 rejected] · 1
i
≤
(
1−
i−1
∑
j=1
pj
)
· 1
i
.
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From the second to the third line, we used the fact that the decisions in rounds 1 to i − 1
do not depend on the candidate in round i. So the probabilities satisfy the following linear
constraints.
p1 + . . . + pi−1 + i · pi ≤ 1 , i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
pi ≥ 0 , i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
Next, we bound the success probability of the algorithm. Note that in the i-th interview
when the employer has seen the candidates C′ ⊆ C and decides about the current candidate
c ∈ C′, he cannot distinguish whether c is best in C′ or even in C. Therefore, we have
Pr [c accepted in interview i | c is best in C] = Pr [c accepted in interview i ∣∣ c is best in C′]
= i · pi .
So the event that in the i-th interview the algorithm chooses the globally best candidate
happens with probability
Pr [c accepted in interview i | c is best in C] · Pr [c is best in C] = i · pi · 1n .
The summation over all interviews gives
Pr [best candidate in C gets accepted] =
n
∑
i=1
i
n
· pi .
Hence, the probability of choosing the best candidate is bounded from above by the
optimal value of the linear program
maximize
n
∑
i=1
i
n
· pi
s. t. p1 + . . . + pi−1 + i · pi ≤ 1 , ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
pi ≥ 0 , ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} .
This again is bounded from above by the value of any feasible solution to the corresponding
dual linear program
minimize
n
∑
i=1
xi
s. t. i · xi + xi+1 + . . . + xn ≥ in , ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
xi ≥ 0 , ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} .
It is easy to verify that the dual solution xi := 0 for i ∈ {1, . . . , b ne c} and xi := 1n (1−∑n−1j=i 1j )
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for i ∈ {d ne e, . . . , n} is feasible and has an objective value of
n
∑
i=1
xi =
n
∑
i=d ne e
1
n
(
1−
n−1
∑
j=i
1
j
)
=
1
n
 n∑
i=d ne e
1−
n
∑
i=d ne e
n−1
∑
j=i
1
j

=
1
n
 n−1∑
i=b ne c
1−
n−1
∑
j=b ne c
j− b ne c
j
 = b ne c
n
·
n−1
∑
j=b ne c
1
j
≤ b
n
e c
n
· ln
(
n− 1
b ne c − 1
)
=
1
e
+ o(1) .
So no algorithm can select the best candidate with a probability larger than 1e .
The above result also has implications for the best possible competitive algorithm.
Corollary 2.4. No algorithm for the secretary problem, even randomized, can be better than 1e -
competitive in expectation.
Proof. Consider an instance of the secretary problem where only one candidate has a very
high weight and all others are almost zero. If an algorithm was better than 1e -competitive in
expectation then it would select the best candidate with a probability higher than 1e , contra-
dicting Theorem 2.3.
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CHAPTER 3
Edge-Weighted Bipartite Matching
The (offline) edge-weighted bipartite matching problem, also known as the assignment prob-
lem, is a classic combinatorial optimization problem with various applications. It occurs, for
example, when we are given a set of workers and a set of tasks and we have to find a suitable
assignment. Imagine that the workers have differing qualifications. That is, a worker can do
some tasks very well, earning him a lot of profit when doing it, but for others he is rather
unqualified, resulting in a low profit. Furthermore, each worker may be assigned to at most
one task and every task may be done by at most one worker. The objective here is to find
such an assignment that maximizes the total profit.
To model these situations we assume a bipartite graph G = (L ∪ R, E) along with non-
negative edge weights w : E → R≥0. The objective is to find a matching M ⊆ E in the
graph, i. e., a disjoint subset of the edges, such that its total weight w(M) := ∑e∈M w(e) is
maximized. Note that since we consider general edge weights, this problem also contains
the unweighted and the vertex-weighted versions of maximum bipartite matching as special
cases.
The integer programming formulation of the (offline) edge-weighted bipartite matching
problem is the following:
maximize ∑
e∈E
w(e) · xe
s. t. ∑
e∈E|r∈e
xe ≤ 1 , ∀r ∈ R
∑
e∈E|`∈e
xe ≤ 1 , ∀` ∈ L
xe ∈ {0, 1} , ∀e ∈ E .
Here, we consider the online version of the edge-weighted bipartite matching problem.
We assume that the vertex set R and the total number of online vertices n = |L| are initially
known, while the vertices in L arrive one by one and in random order. The edges always
appear together with their incident online vertex, i. e., only when a vertex ` ∈ L is revealed,
we learn about the edges {e ∈ E | ` ∈ e} and their respective weights. In every online step,
when a vertex in L arrives, the algorithm has to make an irrevocable decision whether to
add one of its incident edges to the matching, and if so which one.
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Observe that the online bipartite matching problem is a combinatorial generalization of
the secretary problem from Chapter 2. The secretary problem corresponds to the special
case where the right-hand side consists of a single vertex, i. e., |R| = 1. There, every online
vertex has only one incident edge and the combinatorial structure of the matching problem
simplifies to the task of selecting one of these edges. The edge-weighted matching problem
can also be thought of as a secretary problem where the administrator has to offer several
jobs and the candidates have different qualifications for each of them.
In this chapter, we present the first algorithm that solves the edge-weighted bipartite
matching problem optimally. It turns out to be surprisingly simple and contains Algorithm 1
for the secretary problem as a special case. We will show that our algorithm is 1e -competitive
in expectation which matches the best-known bound for the secretary problem.
The obtained result also holds for the matroid secretary problem on transversal matroids.
A transversal matroid is defined on an underlying bipartite graph and the elements of the
matroid are the vertices on the left. Any set in the matroid is independent if there exists
a matching in the bipartite graph that covers the corresponding vertices. In the matroid
secretary problem, the elements along with their respective weights appear online in random
order and the objective is to find a maximum-weight independent set. Since vertex weights
are a special case of edge weights our result for edge-weighted matching also translates to
transversal matroids and improves the best-known competitive ratio to 1e .
An Optimal Online Algorithm Initially, the vertices on the right-hand side, R, and the
number of vertices on the left-hand side, n = |L|, are known. The algorithm starts with
a sampling phase where it does not allocate any of the first b ne c online vertices. In every
further round, it computes a locally optimal solution on the visible part of the instance,
i. e., it computes a maximum-weight matching on the bipartite graph induced by R and the
revealed vertices on the left side. Then, we consider the edge that is assigned to the current
online vertex in this local solution. We call this the tentative edge. If it is possible to add
the tentative edge to the online matching, we allocate it permanently. This is formalized in
Algorithm 2.
Observe that the computation of the locally optimal matchings M(i) is easily doable by
applying the Hungarian method by Kuhn [Kuh55] and Munkres [Mun57].
Algorithm 2: Edge-Weighted Bipartite Online Matching
Input : number of online vertices n = |L| and vertex set R
Output: matching M
Let L′ ⊂ L be the first b ne c randomly arriving vertices;
Set M := ∅;
for every arriving vertex ` ∈ L \ L′ do // online steps i = d ne e to n
Set L′ := L′ ∪ {`} and i := |L′|;
Let M(i) a maximum-weight matching on G[L′ ∪ R];
Let e(i) := (`, r) be the edge assigned to ` in M(i); // tentative edge
if M ∪ e(i) is a matching then // feasibility test
Add e(i) to M; // online allocation
To analyze the expected performance of our algorithm we introduce random variables
21
that reflect the contributed value of each iteration to the output. For every online step i ∈
{1, . . . , n}, we define the variable Ai to be the weight of the edge added to M in this round,
i. e., we set
Ai :=
{
w(e(i)) if the algorithm adds e(i) to M
0 otherwise .
Let ALG denote the weight of the matching M that Algorithm 2 returns. By definition of the
Ai we have ALG = ∑ni=1 Ai. The expected weight of the online matching then satisfies
E [ALG] = E
[
n
∑
i=1
Ai
]
=
n
∑
i=1
E [Ai] .
We will analyze the expected contributions E [Ai] separately and relate them to OPT, the
value of an optimal offline solution.
Lemma 3.1. In the iterations i ∈ {d ne e, . . . , n} of Algorithm 2, the expected contributed weight of
that round to the output satisfies
E [Ai] ≥
b ne c
i− 1 ·
OPT
n
.
Proof. The fundamental idea to bound the expected value of Ai is to carefully break down
the randomness in the order of the vertices. In particular, we will think of the random order
with respect to iterations 1 to i being determined in three steps:
(1) First, it is determined which vertices come within the first i iterations by picking a
random set of cardinality i from L. This fixes the set L′ but the order of its elements is
still undefined.
(2) Second, one of these vertices is selected uniformly at random to come in round i.
(3) Finally, the order among the first i− 1 vertices is determined in the same way, that is,
by iteratively choosing one of them at random and removing it from the set.
This interpretation allows to exploit the randomness in each of these stochastically indepen-
dent steps separately.
Observe that after step (1) the weight of the matching M(i) is already fixed as it only
depends on the visible subgraph G[L′ ∪ R] in iteration i. To analyze its expected value, let
us first consider an optimal offline solution M∗, i. e., a maximum-weight matching in the
full graph with w(M∗) = OPT. Now, consider the restriction of M∗ to the current sub-
graph which we denote by M∗
∣∣
G[L′∪R]. Trivially, since M
(i) is a maximum-weight matching
in G[L′ ∪ R], we have w(M(i)) ≥ w(M∗∣∣G[L′∪R]). By (1), the set L′ can be considered being
uniformly chosen from L with size i. That is, every vertex in L has probability in of being in
L′ and, hence, after step (i), we have
E
[
w(M(i))
]
≥ E
[
w(M∗
∣∣
G[L′∪R])
]
=
i
n
·OPT .
Then, after step (2), the current online vertex ` is fixed as well. Since it is selected uni-
formly among the i vertices in L′, the expected weight of the tentative edge e(i) satisfies
E
[
w(e(i))
]
= 1i · w(M(i)). Together with the previous observation, we obtain
E
[
w(e(i))
]
≥ OPT
n
, (3.1)
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where the expectation is over the randomness in steps (1) and (2).
Step (3) finally determines whether the tentative edge e(i) = {`, r} can actually be added
to M, i. e., whether r is still unmatched at the beginning of iteration i. Observe that this is
the case if in none of the preceding rounds k ∈ {dn/ee, . . . , i− 1} the vertex r was covered by
the tentative edge e(k) of that round. Furthermore, a local solution M(k) does only depend on
the set of visible vertices at that moment and not on the order of the vertices. Again, by the
definition of step (3), the online vertex in round k can be seen as being chosen uniformly at
random among the k left-hand vertices in that round. Hence, r is covered by e(k) in round k
with probability at most 1k and this is independent of the order of its previous k− 1 vertices.
This means, r is not covered by the tentative edge e(k) with probability at least 1− 1k . Using
this argument inductively, we get
Pr [r still unmatched in round i] = Pr
 i−1∧
k=d ne e
r /∈ e(k)
 (3.2)
≥
i−1
∏
k=d ne e
(
1− 1
k
)
=
d ne e − 1
i− 1 =
b ne c
i− 1 .
Now, we can combine inequalities (3.1) and (3.2). The expected weight that round i
contributes to the output is at least
E [Ai] = Pr [r still unmatched in round i] · E
[
w(e(i))
]
≥ b
n
e c
i− 1 ·
OPT
n
.
Having analyzed the expected contribution of each round to the output, we can finally
prove the main result of this chapter. Summing the bounds of Lemma 3.1 over all online
steps gives the expected competitive ratio of the algorithm.
Theorem 3.2. Algorithm 2 for the edge-weighted bipartite matching problem in the random-order
model is 1e -competitive in expectation.
Proof. The output of the online algorithm satisfies ALG = ∑ni=1 Ai. Applying Lemma 3.1 for
all iteration i ∈ {d ne e, . . . , n}, we get
E [ALG] =
n
∑
i=1
E [Ai]
≥
n
∑
i=d ne e
b ne c
i− 1 ·
OPT
n
=
b ne c
n
·
n−1
∑
i=b ne c
1
i
·OPT
≥
(
1
e
− 1
n
)
·OPT .
In the last step, we used bn/ecn ≥ ( 1e − 1n ) and bounded the harmonic sum with its lower in-
tegral ∑n−1i=bn/ec
1
i ≥
∫ n
bn/ec
1
x dx = ln(
n
bn/ec ) ≥ 1. The lower bound on the expected competitive
ratio converges to 1e as n tends to infinity.
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Remarks on the Secretary Problem Remember that the classic secretary problem from
Chapter 2 is a special case of the edge-weighted bipartite matching problem considered here.
It corresponds to the case where the right-hand side of the bipartite graph consists of a sin-
gle vertex. Hence, Algorithm 2 also applies there and has an expected competitive ratio of
1
e . Using the notation from Chapter 2 our algorithm has the following form.
Algorithm 3: Secretary Problem – new version
Input : number of candidates n = |C|
Output: a candidate c˜
Let C′ ⊂ C be the first b ne c randomly arriving candidates;
for every arriving candidate c ∈ C \ C′ do // interviews i = d ne e to n
Set C′ := C′ ∪ {c} and i := |C′|;
Let b(i) := argmaxc′∈C′w(c
′) the best candidate seen so far;
if c = b(i) and the job is still available then
Accept c permanently;
Algorithm 3 again samples the first b ne c candidates. But, in contrast to the classic algo-
rithm for the secretary problem, it does not construct a threshold value from this sample set.
Instead, in every round, it identifies the best among all candidates that have appeared so far.
If the current online candidate happens to be this locally optimal candidate and if the job is
still available, the algorithm accepts.
It is easy to observe that the classic algorithm (Algorithm 1) and Algorithm 3 behave
identically. As long as the job is still available, an online candidate is locally optimal if and
only if it beats the best candidate in the sample set. Nevertheless, it is tempting to say that
Algorithm 3 is the better one since the principle of computing locally optimal solutions also
extends to generalizations.
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CHAPTER 4
Combinatorial Auctions
In the combinatorial auction problem, there is a set of different items and a set of bidders
who have valuations for them. The bidders, however, do not necessarily have valuations for
individual items but they can have specific valuations for bundles, i. e., subsets of the items.
The general task is to assign the items to the bidders in such a way that the social welfare,
which is the sum of the bidders’ valuations for their allocated set, is maximized.
We consider combinatorial auctions where the bidders appear online and in random or-
der. Whenever a bidder arrives, she specifies the valuations for the bundles that she is inter-
ested in and, if the respective items are still available, the algorithm may give one of these
sets to her. For now, we ignore incentive issues and assume that the bidders willingly reveal
their true valuations. In Chapter 6, we show how to deal with strategic agents and present
truthful mechanisms.
More formally, the set of items I and the total number of online bidders n = |B| are
initially known. When the items are available multiple times, we denote their respective
multiplicity by bi ∈ N for each item i ∈ I and the minimum item multiplicity by b :=
mini∈I bi. These are also known. In each online step, a bidder j ∈ B arrives with a valuation
function vj : 2I → R≥0 and the algorithm has to assign a bundle of items Sj ⊆ I to her.
We assume that the valuation functions are normalized, i. e., they satisfy vj(∅) = 0. The
objective is to find an allocation (Sj)j∈B that maximizes the social welfare ∑j∈B vj(Sj) such
that every item i is allocated at most bi times.
The linear programming relaxation of the (offline) combinatorial auction problem is the
following:
maximize ∑
j∈B, S⊆I
vj(S) · xj,S
s. t. ∑
j∈B, S⊆I|i∈S
xj,S ≤ bi , ∀i ∈ I
∑
S⊆I
xj,S ≤ 1 , ∀j ∈ B
xj,S ≥ 0 , ∀j ∈ B, S ⊆ I .
Observe that the constraint matrix of the linear program is a 0/1-matrix and that the
columns consist of the incidence vectors of each bidder’s sets. In later chapters, we will
relax the 0/1-entries to general non-negative entries.
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Also note that the edge-weighted bipartite matching problem from Chapter 3 is a special
case of the combinatorial auction problem. There, every item was available only once and
the bidders were exclusively interested in single items and not in whole bundles. Here, we
allow different valuations for every possible subset of items.
In this chapter, we will analyze the combinatorial auction problem for various differ-
ent types of valuation functions. We start by considering the setting where the bidders are
exclusively interested in bundles of cardinality at most d. For general item multiplicities,
where every item is available at least b times, we present an Ω
( 1
d1/b
)
-competitive algorithm.
When every item is available exactly once, we show that this algorithm is not only Ω
( 1
d
)
-
competitive but it even obtains an exact competitive ratio of 1e·d . We also give an upper
bound for the latter case and show that every algorithm must be O
( log log d
log d
)
-competitive due
to the online nature of the problem. If the bidders are interested in bundles of unbounded
size, we can modify the algorithm to become Ω
( 1
|I|1/(b+1)
)
-competitive. Finally, we show that
for bidders with submodular valuation functions there is a 1e -competitive algorithm.
4.1 Bundles of Bounded Cardinality
In this section, we consider the case that bidders are interested in sets of bounded size.
Specifically, we assume that they only want bundles of cardinality at most d ∈N.
For the sake of generality, we also admit larger sets but their valuations are dominated
by the valuations for bundles with at most d items. Formally,
∀j ∈ B, ∀S ⊆ I : vj(S) ≤ max
T⊆S, |T|≤d
vj(T) .
Hence, in any reasonable allocation the bidders should always get assigned bundles of size
at most d.
Observe that the considered valuation functions are not necessearily monotone and we
also do not assume monotonicity.
4.1.1 General Item Multiplicities
We start with the general setting where every item i ∈ I is available with multiplicity bi
and we denote the minimum multiplicity by b, i. e., bi ≥ b (∀i ∈ I). For this, we present an
algorithm that is Ω
( 1
d1/b
)
-competitive in expectation. In Section 4.1.2, we will reconsider the
calculations for the case that every item is available only once and specify the exact value of
the hidden constant in the Ω-notation.
Similar to the algorithm for the edge-weighted online matching problem, we start with
a sampling phase in which the bidders get nothing. Then, in every subsequent online it-
eration, the algorithm first computes a locally optimal solution and uses it as a guideline
for the online decision. Namely, it always solves the linear programming relaxation where
the instance is restricted to those bidders that are revealed up to that time. Observe that
in this optimal fractional solution, by definition, the allocations of every bidder add up to
at most one. This allows us to interpret the fractional allocations of the current bidder as a
probability distribution over her bundles. We choose one of the online bidder’s bundles by
randomized rounding and assign it to her permanently if all items in the chosen set are still
available at least once. Otherwise, she gets nothing.
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Solving the linear relaxation and performing randomized rounding is merely necessary
to maintain polynomial runtime. If in every iteration we were given an approximate integral
solution for the restricted combinatorial auction, we could essentially use Algorithm 2 to
obtain the same results and only lose the additional approximation factor.
The algorithm takes a parameter p < 1 as an input. We will specify later how to set it.
Algorithm 4: Online combinatorial auctions with bundles of bounded size d
Input : p ∈ [0, 1], number of bidders n = |B|, items I with multiplicities bi (∀i ∈ I)
Output: allocation (Sj)j∈B
Let B′ ⊂ B be the first p · n randomly arriving bidders;
Set Sj := ∅ for all j ∈ B′;
for each arriving bidder j ∈ B \ B′ do // online steps ` = pn + 1 to n
Set B′ := B′ ∪ {j} and ` := |B′|;
Let x(`) be an opt. fractional solution to the LP relaxation with bidders B′;
Choose S(`) ⊆ I where Pr
[
S(`) := S
]
= x(`)j,S and Pr
[
S(`) := ∅
]
= 1−∑S⊆I x(`)j,S ;
if every item i ∈ S(`) is allocated at most bi − 1 times then
Set Sj := S(`);
else
Set Sj := ∅;
In every online iteration ` ∈ {pn + 1, . . . , n}, the algorithm first chooses a bundle S(`)
by randomly rounding the fractional allocation of the current bidder j. We call this set her
tentative bundle since, eventually, it only gets assigned if all the items in it are still available
at least once. To bound the obtained social welfare, we consider every iteration of the online
algorithm separately and analyze the expected valuation of the allocated set. Therefore, we
define random variables A` for ` ∈ {1, . . . , n} that reflect the valuation generated in the
respective round. Formally, for online bidder j in iteration `, we define
A` :=
{
vj(S(`)) if the algorithm sets Sj := S(`)
0 if the algorithm sets Sj := ∅ .
Let ALG denote the social welfare obtained by the algorithm, then we have ALG =
∑j∈B vj(Sj) = ∑n`=1 A`. The expected social welfare satisfies
E [ALG] = E
[
n
∑
`=1
A`
]
=
n
∑
`=1
E [A`] .
We will consider the expected contributions E [A`] separately and compare them to an
offline optimum. Let x∗ = (x∗j,S)j,S be an optimal fractional solution to the offline linear
programming relaxation and let OPT := ∑j∈B, S⊆I vj(S) · x∗j,S denote the corresponding social
welfare1. Observe that we compare the expected contributions to OPT. Therefore, the final
competitive ratio even holds with respect to the fractional offline optimum and not only with
respect to the integral offline optimum.
1We will also use the abbreviated notation v(x) for the social welfare of a fractional allocation vector x to omit
the long expression ∑j∈B, S⊆I vj(S) · xj,S.
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Lemma 4.1. Let OPT be the value of a fractional offline optimum. For every online step ` ∈ {pn +
1, . . . , n} of Algorithm 4 the expected contribution of that round to the output satisfies
E [A`] ≥
(
1− d ·
(
e(1− p)
p
)b)
· OPT
n
.
Proof. Very similar to the proof of Lemma 3.1, we will analyze the expected value of the
random variable A` by a careful reinterpretation of the random order of the bidders up to
round `. Here, however, the algorithm itself is randomized so we also have to take this
additional random experiment into account.
The random order of the bidders that appear in rounds 1 to ` can be seen as being deter-
mined by the following sequence of stochastically independent random experiments.
(1) Determine the set of visible bidders (but not their order) by uniformly choosing a set
of cardinality ` from B.
(2) Select one of these bidders uniformly to be the last in their order, i. e., the current online
bidder.
(3) Determine the order of the first `− 1 bidders iteratively by uniformly selecting one of
them and putting her at the end of their order.
By the definition of A` we have
E [A`] = E
[
vj(S(`))
]
· Pr
[
algorithm sets Sj := S(`)
]
. (4.1)
We will consider these terms separately. First, we bound the expected valuation of the online
bidder for the tentative set. Then, we analyze the probability that it is actually assigned to
her.
After (1), the set of visible bidders B′ in iteration ` is fixed. Observe that the LP relaxation
of the revealed instance does not depend on the order of the bidders. Hence, this also already
determines the social welfare of the fractional allocation x(`). Now, consider the optimal
fractional offline solution x∗ with v(x∗) = OPT. We denote its restriction to the bidders in B′
by x∗
∣∣
B′ . Since x
(`) is an optimal solution to the restricted LP relaxation and x∗
∣∣
B′ is feasible,
we have v(x(`)) ≥ v(x∗∣∣B′). By (1), every bidder in B has probability `n of being selected forB′, which gives
E
[
v(x(`))
]
≥ E [v(x∗∣∣B′)] = `n ·OPT .
After (2), the current online bidder j is fixed. By the definition of (2), we can consider
her as being selected uniformly among the ` bidders in B′. Hence, her expected share on the
social welfare of the fractional allocation x(`) is 1` · v(x(`)). Formally, E
[
∑S⊆I vj(S) · x(`)j,S
]
=
1
` · v(x(`)). Remember that the tentative bundle S(`) was obtained by randomly rounding
the fractional allocation of the online bidder. By the definition of the rounding alone, her
expected valuation for the tentative bundle is E
[
vj(S(`))
]
= ∑S⊆I vj(S) · Pr
[
S(`) := S
]
=
∑S⊆I vj(S) · x(`)j,S . Together, the last two equalities give
E
[
vj(S(`))
]
=
1
`
· v(x(`)) ,
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where the expectation is over the random choice of the online bidder in (2) and the random-
ized rounding. In combination with the previous bound on the expected social welfare of
the fractional allocation x(`), we finally obtain
E
[
vj(S(`))
]
≥ OPT
n
. (4.2)
Here, the expectation is over the random choices in (1) and (2) and the selection of the tenta-
tive bundle by randomized rounding.
In the rest of the proof, we analyze the probability that the algorithm actually allocates
the tentative bundle S(`) to the online bidder. This is determined by the random choices in
(3). Remember that the tentative bundle gets assigned if every item i ∈ S(`) was previously
allocated at most bi − 1 times. We consider the complementary event that there exists an
item in S(`) which is already assigned at least bi times. Observe that any item i ∈ I can only
be assigned that often, if, in at least bi of the preceding iterations, it was contained in the
tentative sets. Formally, for some subset C ⊆ {pn + 1, . . . , ` − 1} with |C| = bi, the event
(i ∈ S(k)) occurred in each round k ∈ C. Using union bounds over the items in S(`) and the
possible sets C, we get
Pr
[
algorithm sets Sj := S(`)
]
= 1− Pr
 ∨
i∈S(`)
(i already assigned at least bi times)

≥ 1− ∑
i∈S(`)
Pr
 ∨
C⊆{pn+1,...,`−1},
|C|=bi
(∧
k∈C
i ∈ S(k)
)
≥ 1− ∑
i∈S(`)
∑
C⊆{pn+1,...,`−1},
|C|=bi
Pr
[∧
k∈C
i ∈ S(k)
]
.
Using the fact Pr
[∧
k∈C i ∈ S(k)
]
≤ ( bipn)bi , which we show at the end of this proof, and since
there are at most ((1−p)nbi ) possibilities of choosing the set C with cardinality bi, we obtain
Pr
[
algorithm sets Sj := S(`)
]
≥ 1− ∑
i∈S(`)
((
(1− p)n
bi
)
·
(
bi
pn
)bi)
≥ 1− ∑
i∈S(`)
((
e(1− p)n
bi
)bi
·
(
bi
pn
)bi)
= 1− ∑
i∈S(`)
(
e(1− p)
p
)bi
≥ 1− d ·
(
e(1− p)
p
)b
. (4.3)
To get from the first to the second line, we applied the classic upper bound (ab) ≤ ( e·ab )b on
the binomial coefficient. And in the last inequality we used |S(`)| ≤ d, bi ≥ b and e(1−p)p ≤ 1
for our parameter p.
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Finally, combining the inequalities (4.1), (4.2) and (4.3) gives
E [A`] = E
[
vj(S(`))
]
· Pr
[
algorithm sets Sj := S(`)
]
≥ OPT
n
·
(
1− d ·
(
e(1− p)
p
)b)
.
The last statement proves the lemma.
It only remains to show the correctness of the claimed inequality Pr
[∧
k∈C i ∈ S(k)
]
≤( bi
pn
)bi for subsets of previous rounds C ⊆ {pn+ 1, . . . , `− 1}with |C| = bi. Here, we will use
the reinterpretation of the random order as specified in (3). We start by analyzing the prob-
ability Pr
[
i ∈ S(k)
]
for any fixed item i ∈ I and any fixed iteration k ∈ {pn + 1, . . . , `− 1}.
Denote the set of participating bidders in that round by B′ with |B′| = k. Now assume that
not only the online bidder of that iteration but all bidders in B′ did randomized rounding
according to their respective part of the fractional allocation x(k). Then every bidder j′ ∈ B′
had the probability ∑S⊆I|i∈S x
(k)
j′,S of containing i in her rounded bundle. And the expected
number of rounded sets that contained the item i was at most bi as x(k) is a feasible solution
to the LP relaxation and satisfies the constraint ∑j′∈B′ ∑S⊆I|i∈S x
(k)
j′,S ≤ bi. By (3), we can in-
terpret the online bidder in iteration k to be selected uniformly among the k bidders in B′.
Hence, her rounded bundle contains i with probability Pr
[
i ∈ S(k)
]
≤ bik and this is inde-
pendent of the order of the previous k − 1 bidders. Using the above argument inductively
on the bi rounds in C and since k ≥ pn, we get
Pr
[∧
k∈C
i ∈ S(k)
]
≤∏
k∈C
bi
k
≤
(
bi
pn
)bi
.
The bound of Lemma 4.1 holds for every single online iteration after the sampling phase.
Summing over all rounds and setting the parameter p to an appropriate value, we obtain the
expected competitive ratio of the algorithm.
Theorem 4.2. For online combinatorial auctions with bundles of bounded size d ≥ 1 and item mul-
tiplicities at least b, set the parameter p to p := e(2d)
1/b
1+e(2d)1/b
. In the random-order model, Algorithm 4
is Ω
( 1
d1/b
)
-competitive in expectation, even with respect to the fractional offline optimum.
Proof. The social welfare that the online algorithm obtains is ALG = ∑n`=1 A`. Applying the
bound of Lemma 4.1 on the iterations pn + 1 to n, we get
E [ALG] =
n
∑
`=1
E [A`]
≥
n
∑
`=pn+1
(
1− d ·
(
e(1− p)
p
)b)
· OPT
n
= (1− p) ·
(
1− d ·
(
e(1− p)
p
)b)
·OPT .
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Substituting the parameter p = e(2d)
1/b
1+e(2d)1/b
gives
E [ALG] ≥ 1
1+ e(2d)1/b
·
(
1− d ·
(
e
e(2d)1/b
)b)
·OPT
=
1
1+ e(2d)1/b
· 1
2
·OPT
≥ 1
2+ 4ed1/b
·OPT .
4.1.2 No Item Multiplicities
When every item in I is not available multiple times but only once, i. e., bi = 1 (∀i ∈ I),
then we know by Theorem 4.2 that Algorithm 4 is Ω( 1d )-competitive in expectation. By
having a closer look at the above calculations, we can determine the exact constant in the
Ω-notation for this special case. It turns out that the expected competitive ratio is 1e·d . This
ratio corresponds perfectly to the results of Chapter 3 where we presented a 1e -competitive
algorithm for edge-weighted bipartite matching. In that setting, we had d = 1 and bi = 1 for
all items i ∈ I .
Note that we can safely assume d ≥ 2 in this section as the case of d = 1 has been
completely covered in Chapter 3.
Theorem 4.3. For online combinatorial auctions with bundles of bounded size d ≥ 2 and item
multiplicities bi = 1 (∀i ∈ I), set the parameter p to p := d1+d . In the random-order model,
Algorithm 4 is 1e·d -competitive in expectation, even with respect to the fractional offline optimum.
Proof. First, we are going to give a better bound than in Lemma 4.1 on the expected contri-
bution E [A`] of any iteration ` ∈ {pn + 1, . . . , n}. Equalities (4.1) and (4.2) are independent
of the item multiplicities and remain unchanged. Equality (4.3), however, the bound on the
success probability of assigning a tentative bundle S(`) to bidder j, can be improved. In the
proof of Lemma 4.1, we showed
Pr
[
algorithm sets Sj := S(`)
]
≥ 1− ∑
i∈S(`)
∑
C⊆{pn+1,...,`−1},
|C|=bi
Pr
[∧
k∈C
i ∈ S(k)
]
.
Simplifying the inequality for the case bi = 1 and using the fact Pr
[
i ∈ S(k)
]
≤ bik = 1k , which
we also had seen there, we obtain
Pr
[
algorithm sets Sj := S(`)
]
≥ 1− d ·
`−1
∑
k=pn+1
Pr
[
i ∈ S(k)
]
≥ 1− d ·
`−1
∑
k=pn+1
1
k
. (4.4)
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Combining (4.1), (4.2) and (4.4) gives a bound similar to the statement of Lemma 4.1. For
every iteration ` ∈ {pn + 1, . . . , n}, we have
E [A`] ≥
(
1− d ·
`−1
∑
k=pn+1
1
k
)
· OPT
n
. (4.5)
It remains to sum (4.5) over all iterations of the algorithm like we did in the proof of
Theorem 4.2. So we obtain
E [ALG] =
n
∑
`=1
E [A`]
≥
n
∑
`=pn+1
(
1− d ·
`−1
∑
k=pn+1
1
k
)
· OPT
n
=
(
(1− p) · n− d ·
n
∑
k=pn+1
n− k
k
)
· OPT
n
=
(
(1− p) · (1+ d)− d ·
n
∑
k=pn+1
1
k
)
·OPT
≥
(
(1− p) · (1+ d)− d · ln
(
1
p
))
·OPT .
In the last inequality, we bounded the harmonic sum by its upper integral ∑nk=pn+1
1
k ≤∫ n
pn
1
x dx = ln(n)− ln(pn) = ln( 1p ). Inserting the term d1+d for the parameter p and using the
series representation of the natural logarithm ln(1+ x) = −∑∞k=1 (−1)
k ·xk
k , we get
E [ALG] ≥
(
1− d · ln
(
1+
1
d
))
·OPT
=
(
1+ d ·
∞
∑
k=1
(−1)k
k · dk
)
·OPT
=
1
d
·
(
1
2
− 1
3 · d +
1
4 · d2 −
1
5 · d3 + . . .
)
·OPT
≥ 1
d
·
(
1
2
− 1
3 · d +
1
4 · d2 −
1
5 · d3
)
·OPT
≥ 1
d
· 1
e
·OPT .
The last inequality holds since it is valid for d = 2 and, as the left-hand side grows mono-
tonically in d, it then holds for all d ≥ 2.
4.1.3 Upper Bound
To complement the result of the previous section, we now give an upper bound on the best-
possible competitive ratio for online combinatorial auctions with bundles of bounded size
and no item multiplicities, i. e., bi = 1 (∀i ∈ I). In Section 4.1, we have seen an algorithm
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for this case that was 1e·d -competitive in expectation. Here, we provide an upper bound of
O( ln ln(d)ln(d) ) on the competitiveness of any algorithm.
The bound will build entirely on the online nature of the problem so it even holds when
the algorithm is allowed to have unlimited computational power. The proof is inspired by
an impossibility result from Babaioff et al. [BIK07].
The basic idea is to construct a highly symmetric set system where every set intersects
with almost all other sets. It has the consequence that, as soon as an online algorithm com-
mits to one of these, only very few feasible options remain.
Given any prime number p, we can do the following construction. First, define the
ground set of items I := {i[k, `] | k, ` ∈ {0, . . . , p − 1}} which has p2 elements. Then, for
every pair of numbers (a, b) ∈ {0, . . . , p − 1} × {0, . . . , p − 1}, we define a set S(a, b) :=
∪p−1k=0 i[k, a·k+b (mod p)]. Obviously, these are p2 sets and each has size |S(a, b)| = p.
Lemma 4.4. For any fixed prime number p, the ground set I and the sets S(a, b) ⊂ I satisfy the
following properties:
1. for every a ∈ {0, . . . , p− 1} the p sets S(a, 0), S(a, 1), . . . , S(a, p−1) are pairwise disjoint,
2. every set S(a, b) intersects all p · (p− 1) sets S(a′, b′) with a′ 6= a and b′ ∈ {0, . . . , p− 1}.
Proof. To prove the first property, take any two sets S(a, β) and S(a, β
′) with β 6= β′. We have
S(a, β) = ∪p−1k=0 i[k, a·k+β (mod p)] and S(a, β
′) = ∪p−1k=0 i[k, a·k+β′ (mod p)]. If they were intersecting,
there was an item i[k, `] in the two sets that coincides in both indices, i. e., there was a k ∈
{0, . . . , p − 1} with a · k + β (mod p) = a · k + β′ (mod p). This, however, cannot be the
case as β 6= β′.
To prove the second property, consider S(a, b) and an arbitrary other set S(a
′, b′) with a′ 6=
a. By definition, S(a, b) = ∪p−1k=0 i[k, a·k+b (mod p)] and S(a
′, b′) = ∪p−1k=0 i[k, a′·k+b′ (mod p)]. We have
to find a k ∈ {0, . . . , p− 1} such that a · k + b (mod p) = a′ · k + b′ (mod p). This, however,
is guaranteed to exist since Z/pZ is a field and, hence, the equation has a solution.
Now we can define an instance that provides an upper bound on the competitiveness
of any online algorithm for combinatorial auctions with bundles of bounded size d. We set
d = p and take the corresponding I as the item set, each with multiplicity one. Furthermore,
we define d2 bidders B := {j[a, b] | a, b ∈ {0, . . . , d− 1}}. Every bidder j[a, b] is exclusively
interested in the bundle S(a, b) and the valuation is randomized. With probability 1d , she has
valuation 1 for the bundle S(a, b) and, otherwise, she values it with 0, i. e., we set
vj[a, b](S) :=
{
1 with probability 1d and 0 otherwise , if S = S
(a, b)
0 , if S 6= S(a, b) .
So the expected valuation of bidder j[a, b] for bundle S(a, b) is E
[
vj[a, b](S
(a, b))
]
= 1d .
Theorem 4.5. On the above instance, every online algorithm obtains an expected social welfare less
than 2, while with high probability, there is an allocation with social welfare Ω( ln(d)ln ln(d) ). Hence, for
online combinatorial auctions with bundles of size at most d and item multiplicity one, every online
algorithm is at most O( ln ln(d)ln(d) )-competitive in expectation.
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Proof. As soon as the algorithm allocates any bundle S(a, b) to a bidder j[a, b] we know by
Property 2 of Lemma 4.4 that it cannot allocate any bundle S(a
′, b′) with a′ 6= a. So the bidders
j[a′, b′] with a′ 6= a will not contribute any value to the social welfare. By Property 1 the only
possibility is to assign the bundles S(a, b
′) with b′ 6= b to the bidders j[a, b′]. As these are
only d− 1 and the expected valuation of bidder j[a, b′] for bundle S(a, b′) is 1d , their expected
summed value is less than one. Together the online algorithm obtains an expected social
welfare of less than two.
On the other hand, again by Property 1 of Lemma 4.4, for every a ∈ {0, . . . , d− 1}, we
obtain a feasible allocation by assigning the bundles S(a, 0), S(a, 1), . . . , S(a, d−1) to the respec-
tive bidders j[a, 0], j[a, 1], . . . , j[a, d−1]. We will now show that with high probability one of
these d allocations has a social welfare of ln(d)2 ln ln(d) . For every such allocation, i. e., for every
a ∈ {0, . . . , d− 1}, we consider the probability that at least λ of the bidders j[a, 0] to j[a, d−1]
have valuation 1 for their bundle. This gives
Pr
[
d−1
∑
b=0
vj[a, b](S
(a, b)) ≥ λ
]
=
(
d
λ
)(
1
d
)λ
≥
(
d
λ
)λ (1
d
)λ
=
(
1
λ
)λ
.
Setting λ := ln(d)2·ln ln(d) and since λ
−λ = e−λ·ln(λ), we obtain
Pr
[
d−1
∑
b=0
vj[a, b](S
(a, b)) ≥ ln(d)
2 · ln ln(d)
]
≥ e−
ln(d)
2·ln ln(d) ·ln
(
ln(d)
2·ln ln(d)
)
≥ e−
ln(d)
2·ln ln(d) ·ln ln(d) =
1√
d
.
Now, we can bound the probability that none of the d considered allocations has a social
welfare of at least ln(d)2·ln ln(d) and get
Pr
[
d−1∧
a=0
(
d−1
∑
b=0
vj[a, b](S
(a, b)) <
ln(d)
2 · ln ln(d)
)]
≤
(
1− 1√
d
)d
≤ e− d√d = e−
√
d .
So with high probability, one of the d allocations has a social welfare of at least ln(d)2·ln ln(d) .
4.2 Bundles of Unbounded Cardinality
In this section, we consider combinatorial auctions for bidders with valuations on sets of
unbounded size. Observe that the largest bundle a bidder can get is the full bundle having
cardinality |I|. Applying the result of Theorem 4.2 for this general setting, we would obtain
an Ω
( 1
|I|1/b
)
-competitive algorithm.
Using a technique by Krysta and Vo¨cking [KV12], it is possible to improve the competi-
tive ratio and obtain an algorithm which is Ω
( 1
|I|1/(b+1)
)
-competitive in expectation. The idea
is to choose an appropriate cardinality threshold and restrict the bidders’ valuations to those
bundles whose size is below this limit. For these restricted valuation functions, we apply Al-
gorithm 4. This, of course, might lead to a bad approximation if bidders rather prefer larger
bundles. To compensate for this case, we sometimes exclusively offer full bundles. Our
algorithm will make a randomized choice whether to exclusively offer small or full bundles.
Formally, for a given instance with item set I and item multiplicity b, we define three
new instances:
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• The small-sets instance, where we only allow bundles of bounded size d := b|I|b/(b+1)c.
For every bidder j ∈ B, we set
vsmallj (S) :=
{
vj(S), if |S| ≤ b|I|b/(b+1)c
0, if |S| > b|I|b/(b+1)c .
We will denote the value of the offline optimum of the small-sets instance by OPTsmall.
• The large-sets instance, where we only allow bundles of size larger than d = b|I|b/(b+1)c.
For every bidder j ∈ B, we set
vlargej (S) :=
{
0, if |S| ≤ b|I|b/(b+1)c
vj(S), if |S| > b|I|b/(b+1)c .
We will denote the value of the offline optimum of the large-sets instance by OPTlarge.
• The full-sets instance, where every bidder either gets the full bundle I or nothing. Ac-
tually, instead of assigning the full bundle to a bidder j, we assign her the bundle that
she values most, i. e., argmaxS⊆Ivj(S), and discard the other items I \ argmaxS⊆Ivj(S).
We will denote the value of the offline optimum of the full-sets instance by OPTfull.
Note that, for item multiplicity b, an optimal offline solution of the full-sets instance
assigns a copy of I to each of the b bidders with the highest valuations. Observe that
this setting is equivalent to an instance with only one single item that represents the
whole set I and has multiplicity b. Such an instance can be handled by Algorithm 4
with d = 1 and general b.
Algorithm 5: Online combinatorial auction with bundles of unbounded size
Toss a fair coin with Pr [heads] = Pr [tails] = 12 ;
if heads then
Apply Algorithm 4 to the small-sets instance, i. e., d = b|I|b/(b+1)c and original b;
else
Apply Algorithm 4 to the full-sets instance, i. e., d = 1 and original b;
Theorem 4.6. For online combinatorial auctions with general valuation functions and bidders ar-
riving in random order, Algorithm 5 has an expected competitive ratio of Ω( 1|I|1/(b+1) ), where I is the
item set and b the item multiplicity.
Proof. If the coin shows heads, the algorithm solves the small-sets instance, where we only
consider bundles of size at most d = b|I|b/(b+1)c. By Theorem 4.2, we know that Algorithm 4
is Ω
( 1
d1/b
)
-competitive in expectation with respect to the optimum of this instance OPTsmall.
Hence, in case of “heads”, Algorithm 4 isΩ
( 1
|I|1/(b+1)
)
-competitive in expectation with respect
to OPTsmall.
On the other hand, if the coin shows tails, the algorithm solves the full-sets instance. As
explained, this is handled like an instance with d = 1. Again by Theorem 4.2, the result
is Ω(1)-competitive in expectation with respect to OPTfull. When comparing an optimal
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solutions of the full-sets instance with an optimal solution of the large-sets instance, we
obtain OPTfull ≥ d|I| · OPTlarge. To see this, observe that there are b · |I| items, hence, in
a large-sets instance, at most b·|I|d bidders can get a bundle. The b highest valuations of
these provide a lower bound for the optimal solution of the full-sets instance, which gives
the inequality. So, in case of “tails”, the algorithm is Ω( d|I| )-competitive in expectation, i. e.,
Ω( 1|I|1/(b+1) )-competitive in expectation, with respect to OPTlarge.
Let us denote the value of an optimum solution to the original unmodified instance by
OPT. By the definition of the small-sets and the large-sets instance, we easily see OPTsmall +
OPTlarge ≥ OPT and thus one of the two is a 12 -approximation to OPT. Now, since the output
of Algorithm 4 is Ω
( 1
|I|1/(b+1)
)
-competitive with respect to OPTsmall, respectively OPTlarge, it
is Ω
( 1
|I|1/(b+1)
)
-competitive in expectation with respect to OPT.
4.3 Submodular Valuations
In economic contexts, the bidders often have more structured valuation functions. A very
common feature is the property of diminishing returns or submodularity. It is most easily
illustrated by an example. When a person already had a glass of wine and two cocktails
and now gets an additional beer, her gain in valuation is at most the gain in valuation if she
previously only had the cocktails. Formally, a valuation function vj : 2I → R≥0 is called
submodular if for every S, T ⊆ I with S ⊇ T and every i ∈ I \ S, we have
vj(S ∪ {i})− vj(S) ≤ vj(T ∪ {i})− vj(T) .
In this section, we assume that all valuation functions are monotone and submodular2. In
that case, it is possible to give an algorithm for online combinatorial auctions in the random-
order model which is 1e -competitive in expectation. We start by considering the situation
where every item has multiplicity one, i. e., bi = 1 (∀i ∈ I). Then we show that the same
result also holds for general item multiplicities.
Algorithm 6 is a modified version of the algorithm for bundles of bounded size. In Al-
gorithm 4, we randomly selected a tentative bundle S(`) and assigned it to the online bidder
if all of its items were still available. If, however, any item in S(`) was already assigned to a
previous bidder, then the online bidder got nothing at all. Here instead, we will simply re-
strict the tentative bundle S(`) to those items that are still available and assign this restricted
set to the online bidder.
Like in the analysis of Algorithm 4, we will give a lower bound on the probability that
the items in a tentative bundle S(`) are still available. This will allow us to use the following
known property of submodular functions from Feldman et al. [FNS11] to bound the value
of the assigned bundle.
Proposition 4.7 ([FNS11]). Given a normalized, monotone and submodular function f : 2I →
R≥0, a set S ⊆ I and a random set S′ ⊆ S, where every element of S is contained in S′ with
probability at least p (not necessarily independently). Then E [ f (S′)] ≥ p · f (S).
2An equivalent definition of submodularity is to assume vj(S∪T)+ vj(S∩T) ≤ vj(S)+ vj(T) for all S, T ⊆ I .
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Algorithm 6: Online combinatorial auctions with submodular valuation functions
Input : number of bidders n = |B|, items I
Output: allocation (Sj)j∈B
Let B′ ⊂ B be the first b ne c randomly arriving bidders;
Set Sj := ∅ for all j ∈ B′;
for each arriving bidder j ∈ B \ B′ do // online steps ` = d ne e to n
Set B′ := B′ ∪ {j} and ` := |B′|;
Let x(`) be an opt. fractional solution to the LP relaxation with bidders B′;
Choose S(`) ⊆ I where Pr
[
S(`) := S
]
= x(`)j,S and Pr
[
S(`) := ∅
]
= 1−∑S⊆I x(`)j,S ;
Set S′(`) := S(`) \ ∪j′∈B′\{j}Sj′ ;
Set Sj := S′(`);
Proof. Consider an arbitrary order of the elements in S = {i1, i2, . . . , i|S|} and let Xk be an
indicator random variable for the event (ik ∈ S′). Denote the sets {i1, i2, . . . , ik} by Sk. Then,
E
[
f (S′)
]
= E
[ |S|
∑
k=1
Xk ·
(
f (S′ ∩ Sk−1 ∪ {ik})− f (S′ ∩ Sk−1)
)]
=
|S|
∑
k=1
Pr [Xk = 1] · E
[
f (S′ ∩ Sk−1 ∪ {ik})− f (S′ ∩ Sk−1)
∣∣ Xk = 1]
≥
|S|
∑
k=1
p · ( f (Sk−1 ∪ {ik})− f (Sk−1)) = p · f (S) .
The inequality in the last line holds by the definition of submodularity.
The proof of the following theorem is along the lines of the analysis in Section 4.1.
Theorem 4.8. For online combinatorial auctions in the random-order model with monotone sub-
modular valuations, Algorithm 6 is 1e -competitive in expectation, even with respect to the fractional
offline optimum.
Proof. For any online step ` ∈ {d ne e, . . . , n}, the computation of the fractional solution x(`)
and the tentative bundle S(`) is exactly as in Algorithm 4. So, as in the proof of Lemma 4.1
for bundles of bounded size, we compare it to a fractional offline optimum x∗ with value
OPT and have
E
[
vj(S(`))
]
=
1
`
· E
[
v(x(`))
]
≥ 1
`
· `
n
·OPT = OPT
n
.
Here, the expectation is over the choice of the set B′, the choice of the online bidder j in B′
and the randomized rounding.
Then, the tentative bundle S(`) is restricted to the subset of items that have not been
assigned previously. We can bound the probability of this event for any single item i ∈ I
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like in the proofs of Lemma 3.1 or Lemma 4.1. As seen there, for any of the preceding steps
k ∈ {d ne e, . . . , ` − 1}, an item i is contained in the tentative bundle S(k) with probability
Pr
[
i ∈ S(k)
]
≤ 1k , where the randomness in the choice of the online bidder in step k is used.
Hence, we have
Pr [i still unassigned in step `] = Pr
 `−1∧
k=d ne e
i /∈ S(k)

≥
`−1
∏
k=d ne e
(
1− 1
k
)
=
d ne e − 1
`− 1 =
b ne c
`− 1 .
Using Proposition 4.7 on submodular valuation functions and since every item in S(`) is
in S′(`) with probability at least bn/ec`−1 , we obtain
E
[
vj(S′(`))
]
≥ b
n
e c
`− 1 · E
[
vj(S(`))
]
≥ b
n
e c
`− 1 ·
OPT
n
.
Summing over all iterations of the algorithm, we get
E [ALG] ≥
n
∑
`=d ne e
b ne c
`− 1 ·
OPT
n
=
b ne c
n
·
n−1
∑
`=b ne c
1
`
·OPT
≥
(
1
e
− 1
n
)
· ln
(
n
b ne c
)
·OPT ≥
(
1
e
− 1
n
)
·OPT ,
where we used bn/ecn ≥ ( 1e − 1n ) and bounded the harmonic sum with its lower integral.
In the following theorem we show how to extend the result to the case of general item
multiplicities.
Theorem 4.9. For online combinatorial auctions in the random-order model with item multiplicity
bi for every item i ∈ I and monotone submodular valuation functions, Algorithm 6 is 1e -competitive
in expectation.
Proof. Given an instance with item set I and item multiplicity (bi)i∈I , we simply copy ev-
ery item bi times to obtain the item set I ′ := {ai,1, . . . , ai,bi | i ∈ I} where every item has
multiplicity one. Additionally, we extend every valuation function vj : 2I → R≥0 to I ′ by
setting v′j(S) := vj({i | ai,k ∈ S for some k}) for any S ⊆ I ′. Observe that the new extended
valuation functions are again submodular. Also note that every allocation in the expanded
instance translates to an allocation in the original instance with the same social welfare and
vice versa. Applying Algorithm 6 on the expanded instance is 1e -competitive in expectation
by Theorem 4.8. Hence, it also is 1e -competitive in expectation with respect to the original
instance.
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CHAPTER 5
Generalized Assignment Problem
We now study another classic problem in combinatorial optimization, the generalized as-
signment problem. In this problem, we are given a set of resources R, sometimes called
bins, where every resource r ∈ R has a specific non-negative capacity br ∈ R≥0. Addition-
ally, there is a set of requests, or items,Q. Each request may be assigned to at most one of the
resources, where allocating request j ∈ Q to resource r ∈ R consumes an amount wj,r ∈ R≥0
of that resource’s capacity and raises a profit of pj,r ∈ R≥0. That means, several requests may
be allocated to the same resource as long as the sum of their consumptions is less or equal
than the resource’s capacity. The objective is to find an assignment that maximizes the total
profit.
The (offline) generalized assignment problem can be formulated as the following integer
linear program:
maximize ∑
j∈Q, r∈R
pj,r · xj,r
s. t. ∑
j∈Q
wj,r · xj,r ≤ br , ∀r ∈ R
∑
r∈R
xj,r ≤ 1 , ∀j ∈ Q
xj,r ∈ {0, 1} , ∀j ∈ Q, r ∈ R .
Here, we consider the online version of the generalized assignment problem where the
requests arrive one by one and in random order. We assume that the set of resourcesR, their
capacities br and the total number of online requests n = |Q| are initially known. Whenever
a request j ∈ Q appears, the algorithm learns the resource consumptions wj,r (r ∈ R) and
the corresponding profits pj,r (r ∈ R). We will sometimes refer to these as the options of
an online request. Then, the online algorithm has to decide immediately and irrevocably
whether to assign the current request to some resource and it also has to specify to which
resource, i. e., the algorithm has to commit to one of the options. The online request can
only by assigned to those resources whose remaining capacities are at least as large as the
respective consumptions.
In this chapter, we present an algorithm for the generalized assignment problem in the
random-order online model that is 18.1 -competitive in expectation. Note that, in contrast
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to many other results on special cases, we do not make any further assumptions on the
parameters of the instance.
The generalized assignment problem stands up to its name and generalizes a number of
classic assignment problems. More details on specific results are given in Chapter 1 in the
section on related work. The special cases are the following.
• The edge-weighted matching problem, when wj,r = 1 and br = 1 for all j ∈ Q, r ∈ R.
This problem was considered in Chapter 3 where we presented an optimal algorithm
that is 1e -competitive in expectation in the random-order model.
• The knapsack problem, when |R| = 1. It is itself a weighted generalization of the
secretary problem so the upper bound of 1e on the best possible competitive ratio in the
random-order model remains valid. The previously best competitive ratio of 110e was
given by Babaioff et al. [BIKK07]. The algorithm presented in this chapter improves on
this ratio.
• The AdWords problem, when pj,r = wj,r for all j ∈ Q, r ∈ R. This problem originates
from sponsored search auctions where the set R are advertisers with daily budgets br
and the set Q are search keywords that arrive online. For every keyword, the partici-
pants can specify their valuation and the search engine decides whose advertisement to
show. Then, the selected advertiser is charged its announced amount so they are iden-
tical to the revenues. This problem is generally considered in a relaxed form where the
capacity constraints are not hard but only bound the contribution to the objective func-
tion. Furthermore, the valuations are assumed to be small with respect to the capaci-
ties. That means, the popular AdWords problem is max∑r∈Rmin{∑j∈Q wj,r · xj,r, br}
subject to ∑r∈R xj,r ≤ 1 (∀j ∈ Q) and xj,r ∈ {0, 1} (∀j ∈ Q, r ∈ R). If the ca-
pacity constraints are hard and the values are allowed to be arbitrary, then the best
known competitive ratio of 12 is obtained by the greedy algorithm from Lehmann et
al. [LLN06].
Our algorithm for the online generalized assignment problem will be based on the fol-
lowing simple observation. We can split an instance into a part with large resource con-
sumptions and another one with small resource consumptions. Each of these has structural
properties that can be exploited.
If the requests always consume more than half of any resource’s capacity, we cannot
assign more than one request per resource. Hence, in this case, every feasible integral as-
signment is a matching. In other words, instances of the generalized assignment problem
that satisfy wj,r > 12 · br (∀j ∈ Q, ∀r ∈ R) are structurally equivalent to instances of the
edge-weighted bipartite matching problem. So we can simplify the capacity constraints
∑j∈Q wj,r · xj,r ≤ br (∀r ∈ R) to the well-known matching constraints∑j∈Q xj,r ≤ 1 (∀r ∈ R).
By the results in Chapter 3, there is a 1e -competitive algorithm for such instances. Observe
that the above argument only holds for integral solutions.
If, however, we have wj,r ≤ 12 · br (∀j ∈ Q, ∀r ∈ R), we can always assign at least
two requests to any resource. For this kind of instances, we will use the same algorithmic
framework as we did for combinatorial auctions in Chapter 4. As the resource consumptions
are small compared to the capacities, the probability of successfully assigning a request to a
resource without exceeding the capacity can be bounded.
Formally, for a given arbitrary instance I of the generalized assignment problem, we
define the following two new instances:
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• Let Iheavy be the restricted instance where we only allow the options with wj,r > 12 · br.
The other options are simply discarded. We will denote the value of an optimal integral
solution to Iheavy by OPTheavy.
• Let I light be the complementary restricted instance where we only allow the options
with wj,r ≤ 12 · br. We will denote the value of an optimal integral solution to I light by
OPTlight.
Observe that OPT, the value of an optimal integral solution to the original instance I , satis-
fies
OPTheavy +OPTlight ≥ OPT .
So at least one of the two is a 12 -approximation to OPT. Our algorithm will make a random
choice whether to proceed either on Iheavy or on I light.
Algorithm 7: Online generalized assignment problem
Input : parameters λ, p ∈ [0, 1], number of requests n = |Q|, resourcesR with
capacities br (r ∈ R)
Output: online assignment
Flip a coin with Pr [heads] = λ and Pr [tails] = 1− λ;
if heads then
Only consider the restricted instance Iheavy; // options with wj,r > 12 br
Use Algorithm 2 for online edge-weighted matching;
else
Only consider the restricted instance I light; // options with wj,r ≤ 12 br
Let Q′ ⊂ Q be the first p · n randomly arriving requests;
Leave requests j ∈ Q′ unassigned;
for each arriving request j ∈ Q \Q′ do // online steps ` = pn + 1 to n
Set Q′ := Q′ ∪ {j} and ` := |Q′|;
Let x(`) be an optimal fractional solution to the LP relaxation (i. e., restricted to
requests Q′ and light options);
Choose r(`) ∈ R where Pr
[
r(`) := r
]
= x(`)j,r and Pr
[
r(`) := ∅
]
= 1−∑r∈R x(`)j,r ;
if remaining capacity of r(`) is at least wj,r(`) then
Assign request j to resource r(`);
Theorem 5.1. Set the parameters to λ := 11+16/(3e) and p :=
2
3 . Then, Algorithm 7 for the online
generalized assignment problem in the random-order model is 18.1 -competitive in expectation.
Proof. We analyze the two cases of the algorithm separately. Let us first consider the one
when the coin shows “heads”. In this case the algorithm considers the restricted instance
Iheavy. As seen above, this instance is structurally equivalent to an instance of the edge-
weighted bipartite matching problem and has optimum value OPTheavy. By Theorem 3.2,
we know that the assignment resulting from Algorithm 2 is 1e -competitive in expectation
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with respect to OPTheavy. So we have
E [ALG | heads] ≥ 1
e
·OPTheavy . (5.1)
In the other case, i. e., when the coin shows “tails”, the algorithm proceeds on the re-
stricted instance I light and behaves similarly to the algorithms for online combinatorial auc-
tions in Chapter 4. In every round, the algorithm first computes an optimal fractional assign-
ment for the light part of the revealed instance and subsequently chooses a tentative resource
by randomly rounding the fractional assignment of the online request. If the remaining ca-
pacity of the tentative resource is sufficiently large, the online request gets assigned to it
permanently. Again, we will analyze the expected profits of the online iterations separately.
For every round ` ∈ {1, . . . , n}, when the current request is j and the tentative resource r(`),
we therefore define the random variable
A` :=
{
pj,r(`) if the algorithm assigns j to r
(`)
0 if the algorithm leaves j unassigned .
Then, the profit that the algorithm obtains is given by summing over all iterations and the
expected profit satisfies
E [ALG | tails] = E
[
n
∑
`=1
A`
]
=
n
∑
`=1
E [A`] . (5.2)
For further reference, let x∗ be an optimal fractional offline solution to I light with objective
value pTx∗ ≥ OPTlight.
We will now analyze E [A`], the expected profit obtained in any step ` ∈ {pn+ 1, . . . , n}.
The main idea is to interpret the random order of requests up to iteration ` as being deter-
mined in a specific sequence of stochastically independent random choices.
(1) Determine the set of visible requests (but not their order) by uniformly choosing a set
of cardinality ` from Q.
(2) Select one of these requests uniformly to be the last in their order, that is, the online
request in iteration `.
(3) Fix the order of the other ` − 1 requests iteratively by always selecting one of them
uniformly and putting it at the end of their respective order.
The expected value of the random variable A` can be written as
E [A`] = E
[
pj,r(`)
]
· Pr
[
algorithm assigns j to r(`)
]
. (5.3)
We will use steps (1) and (2) to analyze the first factor and step (3) for the second one.
To bound the first factor E
[
pj,r(`)
]
, remember that in iteration `, the algorithm first com-
putes an optimal fractional solution x(`) for I light restricted to the visible requests Q′. Ob-
serve that the objective value pTx(`) of the fractional assignment does only depend on the set
Q′ and not on its order. Also note that after the random choice in (1), this is already fixed.
Now, consider the restriction of the optimal fractional offline assignment x∗ to these requests
43
and denote it by x∗
∣∣
Q′ . Trivially, p
Tx(`) ≥ pT(x∗∣∣Q′). By (1), the set Q′ can be seen as being
chosen uniformly at random from Q with cardinality |Q′| = `. So every request has proba-
bility `n of being in Q′ and we obtain E
[
pTx(`)
]
≥ E
[
pT(x∗
∣∣
Q′)
]
= `n · pTx∗ ≥ `n ·OPTlight.
Then the algorithm rounds the fractional allocation of the online request j in x(`) to choose
a tentative resource r(`). By the definition of the randomized rounding and since, by (2), j
is interpreted as being chosen uniformly from Q′, we have E
[
pj,r(`)
]
= 1` · pTx(`). Together,
the last two observations imply that the expected profit of a tentative assignment in round `
satisfies
E
[
pj,r(`)
]
≥ 1
n
·OPTlight . (5.4)
Here, the expectation is over the random choice of the revealed bidders in (1), the choice of
the last request in the order by (2) and the randomized rounding.
Let us now bound the success probability of assigning the online request j in round `
to its tentative resource r(`). Remember that the algorithm proceeds on the instance I light
and that the resource consumption of the tentative assignment satisfies wj,r(`) ≤ 12 · br(`) .
Hence, the assignment will definitely be successful if at least half of the capacity of r(`) is still
available. We now consider the complementary event, that more than half of the capacity
of r(`) is already allocated to other requests. Therefore, let us first analyze the expected
resource consumption in the previous rounds. In any iteration k ∈ {pn + 1, . . . , `− 1}, the
algorithm computed a fractional solution for the visible requests and randomly rounded the
assignment of the online request to select a tentative resource. The total consumption of
the fractional solution on any resource r was at most br and, by (3), the online request of
round k can be seen as being chosen uniformly among the k visible requests. Hence, the
expected consumption on any resource r ∈ R in round k was at most brk . And the expected
total consumption on any resource r before round ` is at most ∑`−1k=pn+1
br
k . Using Markov’s
inequality1, we can now bound the probability that more than half of the tentative resource’s
capacity is already allocated to previous requests, leading to
Pr
[
algorithm assigns j to r(`)
]
≥ 1− Pr
[
previous consumption on r(`) at least
br(`)
2
]
≥ 1− ∑
`−1
k=pn+1
b
r(`)
k
b
r(`)
2
= 1− 2 ·
`−1
∑
k=pn+1
1
k
. (5.5)
This bounds the success probability of actually assigning the online request in round ` to its
tentative resource.
Finally, we can combine the previous observations to bound the expected total value that
Algorithm 7 obtains in the case of “tails”. By inserting the inequalities (5.4) and (5.5) into
1Markov’s inequality states that for any non-negative random variable X and constant a > 0 we have
Pr [X ≥ a] ≤ E[X]a .
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(5.3) and summing over all iterations as in equality (5.2), we get
E [ALG | tails] =
n
∑
`=1
E [A`]
≥
n
∑
`=pn+1
E
[
pj,r(`)
]
· Pr
[
algorithm assigns j to r(`)
]
≥
n
∑
`=pn+1
OPTlight
n
·
(
1− 2 ·
`−1
∑
k=pn+1
1
k
)
=
(
(1− p) · n− 2 ·
n
∑
k=pn+1
n− k
k
)
· OPTlight
n
=
(
3 · (1− p)− 2 ·
n
∑
k=pn+1
1
k
)
·OPTlight
≥
(
3 · (1− p)− 2 · ln
(
1
p
))
·OPTlight .
In the last inequality, we bounded the harmonic sum by its upper integral ∑nk=pn+1
1
k ≤∫ n
pn
1
x dx = ln(n)− ln(pn) = ln( 1p ). We can maximize the right-hand side by setting p := 23
as in the theorem and obtain
E [ALG | tails] ≥
(
1− 2 · ln
(
3
2
))
·OPTlight ≥ 316 ·OPTlight . (5.6)
Now that we have analyzed the performance of Algorithm 7 in the case of “heads” and
“tails” separately, we can combine the results to bound the total expected competitive ratio.
Remember that the probability of “heads” is set to λ := 11+16/(3e) and that we already observed
OPTheavy +OPTlight ≥ OPT. Then, by the two inequalities (5.1) and (5.6), we get
E [ALG] = Pr [heads] · E [ALG | heads] + Pr [tails] · E [ALG | tails]
≥ λ · 1
e
·OPTheavy + (1− λ) · 316 ·OPTlight
=
1
e+ 163
· (OPTheavy +OPTlight)
≥ 1
e+ 163
·OPT
≥ 1
8.1
·OPT .
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CHAPTER 6
Packing Linear Programs
The problems described in the previous chapters can all be subsumed by considering the fol-
lowing abstract setting. There is a set of resources with limited capacities and online requests
that arrive one at a time in random order. For every such request, there are multiple ways to
serve it and each of these options implicates its specific profit and resource consumptions.
The objective is to decide for every request whether and how to serve it in order to maxi-
mize the obtained profit while not exceeding the resources’ capacities. This general setting
is identical to online linear packing programs where the variables, i. e., the columns, arrive
online and in random order.
More formally, we assume that there are m resources where each resource i ∈ [m] has
a specific non-negative capacity bi ≥ 0 and these are initially known. The total number
of online requests, n, is known as well. Now every online request has up to K options to
be served and at most one of them can be selected. Choosing option k ∈ [K] for request
j ∈ [n] raises a profit of cj,k ≥ 0 but for every resource i it consumes ai,j,k ≥ 0 of the capacity.
Again, the objective is to maximize the expected total profit without exceeding the resource
capacities.
The offline version can be formulated as a general packing integer program:
maximize ∑
j∈[n], k∈[K]
cj,k · xj,k
s. t. ∑
j∈[n], k∈[K]
ai,j,k · xj,k ≤ bi , ∀i ∈ [m]
∑
k∈[K]
xj,k ≤ 1 , ∀j ∈ [n]
xj,k ∈ {0, 1} , ∀j ∈ [n], k ∈ [K] .
So the online problem above is identical to online packing ILPs of the form max cTx s.t.
Ax ≤ b and 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. In every online step, a set of columns, i. e., the options corresponding
to a request, appears and at most one the respective variables may be set to one. Here, we
consider the online model where the requests arrive in random order.
It is easy to observe that this problem generalizes all the problems from previous chap-
ters. The online combinatorial auctions from Chapter 4, for example, are the special case
where the constraint matrix is a 0/1-matrix. There, the requests correspond to the online
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bidders and the options of a request are the bundles that a bidder is interested in. By setting
the columns of every request to the respective incidence vectors of every bidder’s bundles,
we see that combinatorial auctions can easily be modeled as online packing LPs. Note that
if the bidders are interested in bundles of bounded cardinality d, every column of the cor-
responding packing LP has at most d 1-entries. On the other hand, the general assignment
problem from Chapter 5 is the special case where every option of a request only consumes
capacity of a single resource. There, a request comes with a column for every resource that it
can be assigned to and each of these columns has only one non-zero entry in the respective
row. Observe that in this case the constraint matrix is extremely sparse.
To characterize the instances, we introduce the following two measures. They will pri-
marily affect the performance of our algorithms.
• The capacity ratio B := mini∈[m]
bi
maxj∈[n],k∈[K] ai,j,k
is a lower bound on the ratio between the
capacity of any resource and the maximum demand for this resource.
• The column sparsity d is the maximum number of non-zero entries in any column of the
constraint matrix. Observe that d ≤ m is given naturally.
Intuitively, for instances with a large capacity ratio any request can only block a small
part of the capacities. So the consequences of a bad online decision should not be too severe.
That means, a large capacity ratio should affect the competitive ratio favorably. On the other
hand, for instances where the column sparsity is small it might be easier to find disjoint
allocations where the consumptions are distributed among the resources. Hence, a small
column sparsity might lead to better results.
We present algorithms for the online packing LPs in the random-order model. The main
result is a simple and robust algorithm that is (1− e)-competitive in expectation when the
capacity ratio satisfies B = Ω
( log d
e2
)
. This result is optimal since it can be shown that
for smaller capacity ratios no online algorithm can be (1− e)-competitive, see Agrawal et
al. [AWY09]. The algorithm does not need to know the capacity ratio or the column sparsity
in advance and even obtains a reasonable competitive ratio for small capacity ratio. Namely,
it is Ω
( 1
d2/(B−1)
)
-competitive in expectation for B ≥ 2. If B and d are known in advance, the
expected competitiveness can be improved to be Ω
( 1
d1/(B−1)
)
for B ≥ 2. Finally, we will con-
sider the case of strategic behavior where the requests might misreport their true objective
function. For that setting, we present a truthful mechanism that is (1− e)-competitive in
expectation for B = Ω
( log m
e2
)
and Ω
( 1
m2/(B−1)
)
-competitive in expectation for B ≥ 2.
6.1 Unknown Capacity Ratios
In this section, we give a surprisingly simple algorithm for online packing linear programs in
the random-order model. Interestingly, it is a primal algorithm and it only needs the number
of requests and the capacity vector as initial inputs. This is a distinguishing feature from
previous dual-based algorithms for packing LPs that heavily relied on additional necessary
input parameters. Furthermore, the algorithm is robust in the sense that its behavior is
independent of the capacity ratio of the instance. We will show that the algorithm not only
performs optimal on instances with large capacity ratio but it even works well for instances
where the capacity ratio is as small as two.
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Our algorithm is based on the following natural observation. Consider an optimal off-
line solution to a packing LP instance and choose ` of the n requests uniformly at random.
When restricting the optimal allocation to these ` requests, their expected consumption on
any resource is `n times the consumption of the full offline solution. Hence, their expected
consumption on any resource is at most `n times the capacity of that resource. Now, since
in our online model the requests are revealed in random order, we can assume that in the
`th online step a random subset with cardinality ` of the n requests is visible. We apply the
above fact to construct a simple algorithm that uses the expected resource consumptions as
a general guideline.
More specifically, the algorithm works as follows. In the `th online step, when ` of the
n requests have been revealed, we first compute an optimal fractional solution x˜(`) to the
linear program consisting of all visible columns but where the capacities are scaled down
to `n b. Then, we interpret the fractional allocation of the current online request in x˜
(`) as
a probability distribution over its columns and randomly round it to obtain an option k(`).
Note that this is possible since for each request the fractional allocations add up to at most
one. If the selected tentative column, together with previously allocated columns, does not
exceed the original unscaled resource capacities, we allocate it permanently. Otherwise, the
request is discarded.
To simplify the notion of restricted linear programs, we will use an abbreviated notation.
For any given scaling factor f > 0 and any subset of requests S ⊆ [n], we will denote
by P( f , S) the set of feasible fractional solutions to the LP relaxation in which the capacity
vector b is scaled by f and only requests in S are served. Formally, this is the set of all vectors
x such that (Ax)i ≤ f bi for all i ∈ [m], 0 ≤ ∑k∈[K] xj,k ≤ 1 for all j ∈ S and xj,k = 0 for all
j 6∈ S.
Algorithm 8: Online packing LP
Input : number of requests n, capacity vector b ∈ Rm≥0
Output: online solution vector y
Let S := ∅ be the index set of known requests;
Set y := 0;
for each arriving request j ∈ [n] \ S do // online steps ` = 1 to n
Set S := S ∪ {j} and ` := |S|;
Let x˜(`) be an opt. fractional solution to the scaled LP relaxation maxx∈P( `n ,S) c
Tx;
Choose k(`) ∈ [K] where Pr
[
k(`) := k
]
= x˜(`)j,k and Pr
[
k(`) := ∅
]
= 1−∑k∈[K] x˜(`)j,k ;
Define x(`) with x(`)j′,k =
{
1, if j′ = j and k = k(`);
0, otherwise;
// tentative allocation
if A(y + x(`)) ≤ b then // feasibility test
Set y := y + x(`); // online allocation
In contrast to the algorithms in previous chapters, Algorithm 8 does not have an initial
sampling phase. All online requests, even the first ones, are treated identically. Therefore,
participants who arrive at the beginning of the random-order sequence do not suffer from
the disadvantage of getting nothing by default.
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Observe that, as already mentioned, Algorithm 8 is oblivious to the capacity ratio or the
column sparsity of the instance. The only initial input is the number of online requests to
come and the capacity vector. Furthermore, the behavior of the algorithm is invariant with
respect to scaling constraints. So we can assume without loss of generality that rows are
scaled such that for every resource the maximum possible consumption of a request is one,
i. e., for every constraint i ∈ [m] we have maxj∈[n],k∈[K] ai,j,k = 1. For scaled instances, the
capacity ratio B is identical to the minimum capacity of any resource, i. e., B = bmin :=
mini∈[m] bi.
In the following two subsections, we will analyze the competitive ratio of Algorithm 8
for the case of large capacity ratios B = Ω
( log d
e2
)
and for the case of small capacity ratios
B ≥ 2. Interestingly, it is not necessary for the algorithm to know which of the two cases is
on hand. Its behavior is identical in both.
6.1.1 Large Capacity Ratios
In this section, we analyze the performance of Algorithm 8 on instances with large capacity
ratios and prove that it is
(
1 −O(√log(d)/B))-competitive in expectation. In other words,
the algorithm is (1− e)-competitive in expectation when the capacity ratio B satisfies B =
Ω
( log d
e2
)
.
This result is best-possible for any, even randomized, online algorithm. More specifically,
Agrawal et al. [AWY09] showed that B = Ω
( log m
e2
)
is a necessary condition to allow for
(1− e)-competitive algorithms on instances with column sparsity d = m. This lower bound
is matched by our result. For instances with column sparsity d = 1, there is a known lower
bound of B = Ω
( 1
e2
)
by Kleinberg [Kle05]. This is also matched by our algorithm.
As described in the previous section, the behavior of Algorithm 8 is invariant under
scaling the rows of the linear program. Without loss of generality, we assume in this section
that the maximum entry in any constraint is one, i. e., for every constraint i ∈ [m] we have
maxj∈[n], k∈[K] ai,j,k = 1. Under this assumption, the capacity ratio is identical to the minimum
capacity of any resource, i. e., B = bmin. Therefore, it is sufficient to consider these scaled
instances and we will show that Algorithm 8 is (1 − e)-competitive in expectation if the
minimum capacity satisfies bmin = Ω
( log d
e2
)
.
Similar to the proofs in previous chapters, our analysis consists of three larger steps. For
any iteration of the online algorithm, we first analyze the expected value of the fractional
solution to the scaled linear program in that round. This is done in Lemma 6.1 and provides
a lower bound on the expected value of the tentative allocations. Then, in Lemma 6.2, we
analyze the probability that previous tentative allocations do already exhaust the capacity
of a constraint. This gives us a lower bound on the success probability of allocating the
tentative column in any iteration. Finally, in Theorem 6.3, it remains to add up the expected
contributions of the successful allocations.
The principal idea of the proof is to carefully reinterpret the random input order. Namely,
for any online iteration ` the set of revealed requests and their order can be seen as being
determined in the following way. First, choose an unordered set of cardinality ` from the n
requests uniformly at random. Then, randomly select one of these requests to be the last in
their order. Finally, determine the order of the other ` − 1 requests iteratively in the same
way, i. e., by always selecting one of them at random and placing it as the last of their respec-
tive order. This decomposition into stochastically independent random experiments allows
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to bound the expected contributions of the online iteration. Note that in any round ` the
value of the fractional solution x(`) only depends on the set of visible requests but not on
their order. When the last request in the order is chosen, the share of the online bidder is
fixed, too. The order of the previous `− 1 requests determines whether the tentative alloca-
tion can actually be carried out.
We start by bounding the expected value of the fractional solution x˜(`) in any round `.
Lemma 6.1. For any ` ≥ 2
√
1+ln d
bmin
n, let S ⊆ [n] be a random subset of requests with |S| = `. Then,
we have
E
[
max
x∈P( `n ,S)
cTx
]
≥
(
1− 9
√
1+ ln d
`
n · bmin
)
`
n
· max
x∈P(1,[n])
cTx .
Proof. Let x∗ be an optimal fractional solution to the full unscaled LP maxx∈P(1,[n]) cTx. Based
on this vector, we will construct a feasible solution x′′ to the scaled and restricted linear
program maxx∈P( `n ,S) c
Tx and analyze its properties.
For this purpose, we first consider x′, the projection of x∗ to the set of relevant requests S,
by setting x′j,k := x
∗
j,k if j ∈ S and x′j,k := 0 otherwise. Since every request j has probability `n
of being in S, we have E
[
x′j,k
]
= `n · x∗j,k. Observe, however, that for any constraint i ∈ [m] the
allocation x′ might still use more capacity than `n · bi. Hence, x′ is not necessarily included in
the set P( `n , S).
To obtain a feasible allocation, we will scale each variable by the maximum factor by
which a constraint is violated. Thus, for each variable xj,k, let Cj,k denote the constraints it
influences. Formally, we set Cj,k = {i ∈ [m] | ai,j,k > 0} for every (j, k) ∈ [n]× [K]. Then
we define for each variable a scaling factor Fj,k = min
{
1, mini∈Cj,k
`/n·bi
(Ax′)i
}
and set x′′j,k :=
x′j,k · Fj,k. The restricted and scaled allocation vector x′′ now satisfies Ax′′ ≤ `n b since for
every constraint i we have
(Ax′′)i =∑
j,k
ai,j,kx′j,kFj,k ≤∑
j,k
ai,j,kx′j,k
`
n · bi
(Ax′)i
=
`
n
· bi ,
and, hence, we have x′′ ∈ P( `n , S).
In the rest of the proof, we will analyze the expected value of the scaling factors Fj,k in
order to show E
[
x′′j,k
]
≥
(
1− 9
√
1+ln d
`/n·bmin
)
· E
[
x′j,k
]
. This will give the result of the lemma
since the expected objective value obtained by x′′ is a lower bound on E
[
maxx∈P(`/n,S) cTx
]
.
Fix a request j˜ ∈ [n]. Let us first consider the conditional probability space in which j˜ ∈ S.
Furthermore, fix a constraint i ∈ [m]. We will apply a Chernoff bound on the random vari-
able (Ax′)i, i. e., on the total consumption of allocation x′ on resource i. By defining the ran-
dom variables Xj = ∑k∈[K] ai,j,kx′j,k for each request j ∈ [n], we have (Ax′)i = ∑j∈[n] Xj. Ob-
serve that the variables Xj are binary random variables since every Xj is either ∑k∈[K] ai,j,kx∗j,k
if j ∈ S or zero otherwise. However, they are not independent which precludes applying
standard Chernoff bounds.
Fortunately, as we will show next, the random variables Xj are 1-correlated in the sense
of Panconesi and Srinivasan [PS97]. This allows us to use their Chernoff-like bound in the
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current setting. The exact definition of 1-correlatedness and the resulting theorem of Pan-
conesi and Srinivasan can be found in the appendix.
To show that the variables Xj are 1-correlated (see Definition A.1), we define a twin vari-
able Xˆj for every Xj with j ∈ [n]. In particular, we set Xˆ j˜ to the fixed value ∑k∈[K] ai, j˜,kx∗˜j,k
and for j ∈ [n] \ { j˜} we set Xˆj to ∑k∈[K] ai,j,kx∗j,k with probability `n and to 0 otherwise. These
are stochastically independent. Obviously, we have E
[
Xj
∣∣ j˜ ∈ S] ≤ E [Xˆj ∣∣ j˜ ∈ S] for ev-
ery j ∈ [n]. Hence, the first property of 1-correlatedness is fulfilled as E
[
∑i∈[n] Xi
∣∣∣ j˜ ∈ S] ≤
E
[
∑i∈[n] Xˆi
∣∣∣ j˜ ∈ S] holds by linearity of expectation. To verify the second property, consider
any set of requests I ⊆ [n] and arbitrary positive integers sj for j ∈ [n]. We have
E
[
∏
j∈I
X
sj
j
∣∣∣∣∣ j˜ ∈ S
]
= E
[
∏
j∈I
(
∑
k∈[K]
ai,j,kx′j,k
)sj ∣∣∣∣∣ j˜ ∈ S
]
.
Observe that for the product to be non-zero, none of the involved terms ∑k∈[K] ai,j,kx′j,k may
be zero. By the definition of x′, this can only happen if all j ∈ I also belong to S, i. e., if the
event S ⊇ I occurs. This gives
E
[
∏
j∈I
(
∑
k∈[K]
ai,j,kx′j,k
)sj ∣∣∣∣∣ j˜ ∈ S
]
=
(
∏
j∈I
(
∑
k∈[K]
ai,j,kx∗j,k
)sj)
· Pr [S ⊇ I ∣∣ j˜ ∈ S] .
We can obtain a bound on the probability Pr
[
S ⊇ I ∣∣ j˜ ∈ S] by observing that the set S is
drawn uniformly at random from [n]with cardinality `. The conditional probability depends
on whether I contains the fixed request j˜ or not. For the two cases, we get the following:
• If j˜ /∈ I, we have
Pr
[
S ⊇ I ∣∣ j˜ ∈ S] = (n−|I|−1`−|I|−1)
(n−1`−1)
=
(n− |I| − 1)!
(`− |I| − 1)! (n− `)! ·
(`− 1)! (n− `)!
(n− 1)!
=
(`− 1) · (`− 2) · · · (`− |I|)
(n− 1) · (n− 2) · · · (n− |I|) ≤
(
`
n
)|I|
,
and, hence, in combination, we get
E
[
∏
j∈I
X
sj
j
∣∣∣∣∣ j˜ ∈ S
]
≤
(
∏
j∈I
(
∑
k∈[K]
ai,j,kx∗j,k
)sj)
·
(
`
n
)|I|
=∏
j∈I
((
∑
k∈[K]
ai,j,kx∗j,k
)sj
· `
n
)
=∏
j∈I
E
[
Xˆ
sj
j
∣∣∣ j˜ ∈ S] .
• If j˜ ∈ I, we have
Pr
[
S ⊇ I ∣∣ j˜ ∈ S] = (n−|I|`−|I|)
(n−1`−1)
=
(n− |I|)!
(`− |I|)! (n− `)! ·
(`− 1)! (n− `)!
(n− 1)!
=
(`− 1) · (`− 2) · · · (`− |I|+ 1)
(n− 1) · (n− 2) · · · (n− |I|+ 1) ≤
(
`
n
)|I|−1
,
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which in this case gives
E
[
∏
j∈I
X
sj
j
∣∣∣∣∣ j˜ ∈ S
]
≤
(
∏
j∈I
(
∑
k∈[K]
ai,j,kx∗j,k
)sj)
·
(
`
n
)|I|−1
=
(
∑
k∈[K]
ai, j˜,kx
∗˜
j,k
)s j˜
· ∏
j∈I\{ j˜}
((
∑
k∈[K]
ai,j,kx∗j,k
)sj
· `
n
)
= E
[
Xˆ
s j˜
j˜
∣∣∣ j˜ ∈ S] · ∏
j∈I\{ j˜}
E
[
Xˆ
sj
j
∣∣∣ j˜ ∈ S] =∏
j∈I
E
[
Xˆ
sj
j
∣∣∣ j˜ ∈ S] .
So in both cases the second condition of Definition A.1 holds which shows that the random
variables Xj are 1-correlated.
Let us now apply the Chernoff bound for 1-correlated variables (see Theorem A.2 and
inequality (A.1)) on the random variable (Ax′)i = ∑j∈[n] Xj. The expected value of the sum
of twin variables satisfies E
[
∑j∈[n] Xˆj
∣∣∣ j˜ ∈ S] ≤ `n bi + 1 since x∗ is a feasible LP solution and
ai,j,k ≤ 1. Therefore, we get for all 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1
Pr
[
(Ax′)i ≥ (1+ δ)
(
`
n
bi + 1
) ∣∣∣∣ j˜ ∈ S] ≤ exp(−δ23
(
`
n
bi + 1
))
≤ exp
(
−δ
2
3
`
n
bmin
)
.
Remember that the general purpose of the argument is to analyze the expected value
of the scaling factor Fj˜,k which was defined as min
{
1, mini∈Cj˜,k
`/n·bi
(Ax′)i
}
. Now observe that
`/n·bi
(Ax′)i
≤ 11+δ+1/√bmin implies (Ax′)i ≥ (1 + δ)
(
`
n bi + 1
)
, since ` ≥ 2n√
bmin
. Applying a union
bound over all relevant resources i ∈ Cj˜,k and since |Cj˜,k| ≤ d, we obtain
Pr
[
Fj˜,k ≤
1
1+ δ+ 1√
bmin
∣∣∣∣∣ j˜ ∈ S
]
≤ ∑
i∈Cj˜,k
Pr
[
`
n · bi
(Ax′)i
≤ 1
1+ δ+ 1√
bmin
∣∣∣∣∣ j˜ ∈ S
]
≤ ∑
i∈Cj˜,k
Pr
[
(Ax′)i ≥ (1+ δ)
(
`
n
bi + 1
) ∣∣∣∣ j˜ ∈ S]
≤ d · exp
(
−δ
2
3
`
n
bmin
)
. (6.1)
The above inequality for the cumulative distribution function of Fj˜,k will be our main tool to
find a lower bound on the expected value of Fj˜,k.
Note that by definition the values of the random variable Fj˜,k are in the interval (0, 1]. We
will partition it into infinitely many subintervals and bound the probability mass in each of
these. To define the partition, let us set ξ =
√
3 · 1+ln d`/n·bmin as our step width. For each i ∈ N,
the ith interval is Ii =
( 1
1+(i+1)ξ ,
1
1+iξ
]
. We can bound the expectation of Fj˜,k from below by
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always using the respective lower endpoint of an interval. So, we have
E
[
Fj˜,k
∣∣∣ j˜ ∈ S] ≥ ∞∑
i=0
1
1+ (i + 1)ξ
· Pr
[
Fj˜,k ∈ Ii
∣∣∣ j˜ ∈ S]
=
∞
∑
i=0
(
1− (i + 1)ξ
1+ (i + 1)ξ
)
· Pr
[
Fj˜,k ∈ Ii
∣∣∣ j˜ ∈ S]
= 1−
∞
∑
i=0
(i + 1)ξ
1+ (i + 1)ξ
· Pr
[
Fj˜,k ∈ Ii
∣∣∣ j˜ ∈ S] .
To bound the sum, we split it into three parts, consisting of the ranges i ∈ {0, 1, 2}, i ∈{
3, . . . ,
⌊ 1
ξ + 1
⌋}
and i ∈ {⌊ 1ξ + 1⌋+ 1, . . . }.
i) For the first range, i. e., for i ∈ {0, 1, 2}, we can bound the sum by
2
∑
i=0
(i + 1)ξ
1+ (i + 1)ξ
· Pr
[
Fj˜,k ∈ Ii
∣∣∣ j˜ ∈ S]
≤ ξ ·
(
1 · Pr
[
Fj˜,k ∈ I0
∣∣∣ j˜ ∈ S]+ 2 · Pr [Fj˜,k ∈ I1 ∣∣∣ j˜ ∈ S]+ 3 · Pr [Fj˜,k ∈ I2 ∣∣∣ j˜ ∈ S])
≤ 3ξ ,
where we used that the sum of probabilities is at most one.
ii) For the second range, i. e., for i ∈ {3, . . . , ⌊ 1ξ + 1⌋}, let us set δ = (i− 1)ξ. This implies
δ ∈ (0, 1]. By the definition of ξ, we also have ξ ≥ 1√
bmin
. Applying inequality (6.1)
gives
Pr
[
Fj˜,k ≤
1
1+ iξ
∣∣∣∣ j˜ ∈ S] ≤ Pr
[
Fj˜,k ≤
1
1+ (i− 1)ξ + 1√
bmin
∣∣∣∣∣ j˜ ∈ S
]
≤ d · exp
(
− (i− 1)
2ξ2
3
`
n
bmin
)
= d · exp (−(i− 1)2(1+ ln d))
= exp
(−(i− 1)2(1+ ln d) + ln d)
≤ exp (−i + 1) .
Here, the first equality followed by inserting the definition of ξ. Now, we can use this
to bound the sum over the range i ∈ {3, . . . , ⌊ 1ξ + 1⌋} and obtain
b 1ξ+1c
∑
i=3
(i + 1)ξ
1+ (i + 1)ξ
· Pr
[
Fj˜,k ∈ Ii
∣∣∣ j˜ ∈ S] ≤ b 1ξ+1c∑
i=3
(i + 1)ξ · Pr
[
Fj˜,k ≤
1
1+ iξ
∣∣∣∣ j˜ ∈ S]
≤
b 1ξ+1c
∑
i=3
(i + 1)ξ · exp (−i + 1)
≤ 4e− 3
e(e− 1)2 ξ ≤ ξ .
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iii) For the third range, i. e., for i ∈ {⌊ 1ξ + 1⌋ + 1, . . . }, we combine the terms to use in-
equality (6.1) only once, and obtain
∞
∑
i=b 1ξ+1c+1
(i + 1)ξ
1+ (i + 1)ξ
· Pr
[
Fj˜,k ∈ Ii
∣∣∣ j˜ ∈ S] ≤ Pr
Fj˜,k ≤ 1
1+
(⌊
1
ξ + 1
⌋
+ 1
)
ξ
∣∣∣∣∣∣ j˜ ∈ S

≤ Pr
[
Fj˜,k ≤
1
1+ 1+ 1√
bmin
∣∣∣∣∣ j˜ ∈ S
]
≤ d · exp
(
−1
3
`
n
bmin
)
= exp
(
ln d− 1
3
`
n
bmin
)
≤ exp
(
−1
6
`
n
bmin
)
≤ ξ ,
where we used that `n bmin ≥ 6 ln d.
Finally, we can combine the above bounds on the three ranges and obtain
E
[
Fj˜,k
∣∣∣ j˜ ∈ S] ≥ 1− ∞∑
i=0
(i + 1)ξ
1+ (i + 1)ξ
· Pr
[
Fj˜,k ∈ Ii
∣∣∣ j˜ ∈ S]
≥ 1− 5ξ ≥ 1− 9
√
1+ ln d
`
n · bmin
.
This gives the claimed E
[
x′′˜j,k
]
≥
(
1− 9
√
1+ln d
`/n·bmin
)
· E
[
x ′˜j,k
]
, since x ′˜j,k = 0 for j˜ /∈ S.
The above lemma provides a lower bound on the expected value of the fractional solution
x˜(`) to the restricted and scaled linear program in any round ` of the algorithm. Algorithm 8
then generates an integral vector x(`) from it by randomly rounding the fractional allocation
of the online request. This tentative allocation can only be made permanent if the remaining
capacity in every involved constraint is sufficiently high.
In Lemma 6.2, we will show that in most rounds the remaining capacities are high
enough with sufficiently high probability. For any round of the algorithm, we will ana-
lyze the expected consumption of the previous tentative allocations. This, obviously, gives
an upper bound on the expected resource consumption of the previous permanent alloca-
tions. To obtain a probability bound, we again apply a Chernoff bound. However, similar
to the proof of Lemma 6.1, the involved random variables are correlated since the tentative
allocations in any round are not independent of the tentative allocations in previous rounds.
Lemma 6.2. Consider any round ` with 9
√
1+ln d
bmin
n ≤ ` and ` ≤ (1− 9√ 1+ln dbmin )n. Let S ⊆ [n]
with |S| = ` − 1 be any set of ` − 1 requests and let ES be the event that the requests in S come
within the first `− 1 steps of the random input order. Then, conditioned on ES, the sum of previous
tentative allocations violate any constraint i ∈ [m] with probability at most
Pr
[(
∑
`′<`
Ax(`
′)
)
i
> bi − 1
∣∣∣∣∣ ES
]
≤ 1
d
· exp
(
−n− `
n
√
bi
)
.
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Proof. To analyze the total resource consumption of the tentative allocations before round `,
we will again use a Chernoff bound. For every round `′ < `, we define a random variable
X`′ := (Ax(`
′))i that reflects the consumption of the tentative allocation x(`
′) on resource
i. Although these random variables are not independent, we will show that they are 1-
correlated in the sense of Panconesi and Srinivasan [PS97]. Similar to the proof of Lemma 6.1,
this will allow us to apply their Chernoff-style bound which is given in the appendix.
To show that the variables X`′ are 1-correlated (see Definition A.1), we define a twin vari-
able Xˆ`′ for every X`′ with `′ ∈ {1, . . . , `− 1}. In particular, we set Xˆ`′ to 1 with probability
bi
n and to 0 otherwise. These variables are stochastically independent. We start by verify the
second property of Definition A.1. Therefore, we need to show that for any set I ⊆ [`− 1]
and arbitrary positive integers s`′ , `′ ∈ I, we have
E
[
∏
`′∈I
Xs`′`′
∣∣∣∣∣ ES
]
≤ ∏
`′∈I
E
[
Xˆs`′`′
∣∣∣ ES] .
Now, since Xˆ`′ are 0/1-variables, we have E
[
Xˆs`′`′
∣∣∣ ES] = E [Xˆ`′ ∣∣ ES] = bin . So it suffices to
prove
E
[
∏
`′∈I
Xs`′`′
∣∣∣∣∣ ES
]
≤ ∏
`′∈I
bi
n
.
We show this inequality by induction on |I|. For |I| = 0 the statement is trivially true. So let
us consider a general index set I and let `′1 be its lowest index, i. e., I = {`′1} ∪ I′ with `′1 < `′
for all `′ ∈ I′. By the induction hypothesis, we already know
E
[
∏
`′∈I′
Xs`′`′
∣∣∣∣∣ ES
]
≤ ∏
`′∈I′
bi
n
.
Let a ≥ 0 be an arbitrary real number and consider the probability space conditioned not
only on ES but also on ∏`′∈I′ Xs`′`′ = a. The important observation is the following. Let pi be
any input permutation that causes ES and ∏`′∈I′ Xs`′`′ = a. Then, any permutation pi′ which
differs only in the order of the requests at positions 1, . . . , `′1 also yields ∏`′∈I′ X
s`′
`′ = a as
the exact order of the first `′1 requests is irrelevant for the LP solution computed in rounds
`′ > `′1. In other words, to bound E
[
X`′1
∣∣∣ ES ∧∏`′∈I′ Xs`′`′ = a], we may still consider the
order of the requests at positions 1, . . . , `′1 as unbiased. Formally, let S
′ ⊆ [n] with |S′| = `′1
be any set of requests and let ES′ be the event that the requests in S′ come within the first
`′1 steps of the random input order. Then, conditioned on ES′ ∧ ES ∧∏`′∈I′ Xs`′`′ = a, each
request from S′ comes at position `′1 with probability
1
`′1
. So it can be considered as being
drawn uniformly at random from S′. Given a fixed event ES′ , the fractional solution x˜(`′1)
computed in round `′1 is fixed. By definition, it satisfies (Ax˜
(`′1))i ≤ `
′
1
n bi. Therefore, we know
that, even in the conditional probability space of ES′ , ES and ∏`′∈I′ Xs`′`′ = a, the expected
contribution of x(`
′
1) to constraint i is at most 1`′1
`′1
n bi. Also noting that X`′1 ∈ [0, 1] and, hence,
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X
s`′1
`′1
≤ X`′1 , we get
E
[
X
s`′1
`′1
∣∣∣∣∣ ES ∧ ∏
`′∈I′
Xs`′`′ = a
]
≤ E
[
X`′1
∣∣∣∣∣ ES ∧ ∏
`′∈I′
Xs`′`′ = a
]
=
1
`′1
· E
[
(Ax˜(`
′
1))i
∣∣∣∣∣ ES ∧ ∏
`′∈I′
Xs`′`′ = a
]
≤ 1
`′1
· `
′
1
n
bi =
bi
n
.
Combining this with the induction hypothesis, we obtain
E
[
∏
`′∈I
Xs`′`′
∣∣∣∣∣ ES
]
= E
[
X
s`′1
`′1
· ∏
`′∈I′
Xs`′`′
∣∣∣∣∣ ES
]
≤ bi
n
· E
[
∏
`′∈I′
Xs`′`′
∣∣∣∣∣ ES
]
≤ bi
n
· ∏
`′∈I′
bi
n
= ∏
`′∈I
bi
n
,
which shows the second property of Definition A.1. To prove the first property, observe that
for every `′ < ` we already have E [X`′ | ES] ≤ E
[
Xˆ`′
∣∣ ES] by the above argument. So we
obtain E [∑`′<` X`′ | ES] ≤ E
[
∑`′<` Xˆ`′
∣∣ ES] by linearity of expectation. Taken together, this
shows that the random variables X`′ are 1-correlated.
Let us now apply the Chernoff bound of Panconesi and Srinivasan [PS97] on the random
variable ∑`′<` X`′ . First observe that the expected value of the sum of twin variables satisfies
E
[
∑`′<` Xˆ`′
∣∣ ES] = ∑`−1`′=1 bin ≤ `n bi. Setting δ = 1− `n bibi−1 , we obtain
(1− δ)(bi − 1) = `n bi ≥ E
[
∑
`′<`
Xˆ`′
∣∣∣∣∣ ES
]
.
Now, using Theorem A.2 and inequality (A.1), we get for every 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1
Pr
[
∑
`′<`
X`′ > bi − 1
∣∣∣∣∣ ES
]
≤ Pr
[
∑
`′<`
X`′ > (1+ δ)(1− δ)(bi − 1)
∣∣∣∣∣ ES
]
≤ exp
(
−δ
2
3
(1− δ)(bi − 1)
)
. (6.2)
It remains to analyze the argument of the exponential function to obtain the claimed
bound. By the initial assumptions on ` we have 9
√
1+ln d
bmin
n ≤ ` and ` ≤
(
1− 9
√
1+ln d
bmin
)
n.
The second condition implies 1bi−1 ≤ 1√bi ≤
1
9
(
1− `n
)
and, hence, we get
δ =
(
1− `
n
)
− `
n
· 1
bi − 1 ≥
8
9
(
1− `
n
)
. (6.3)
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On the other hand, we also have 1− δ = `n bibi−1 ≥ `n such that we get
min {δ, 1− δ} ≥ min
{
8
9
(
1− `
n
)
,
`
n
}
≥ 8
√
1+ ln d
bmin
.
Using the fact δ(1− δ) ≥ 12 ·min {δ, 1− δ}, this gives
bi − 1
3
δ(1− δ) ≥ bi − 1
3
· 4
√
1+ ln d
bmin
.
By multiplying the last inequality with inequality (6.3), we get
δ2
3
(1− δ)(bi − 1) ≥ 89
(
1− `
n
)
· 4(bi − 1)
3
√
1+ ln d
bmin
≥ 10
9
(
1− `
n
)√
bi (1+ ln d)
≥ 1
9
(
1− `
n
)√
bi · ln d +
(
1− `
n
)√
bi
≥ ln d + n− `
n
√
bi ,
where we used
(
1− `n
)√
bi ≥ 9
√
ln d in the last step.
Finally, we can apply the very last inequality to inequality (6.2) and obtain the claimed
result.
Pr
[
∑
`′<`
X`′ > bi − 1
∣∣∣∣∣ ES
]
≤ exp
(
−δ
2
3
(1− δ)(bi − 1)
)
≤ exp
(
− ln d− n− `
n
√
bi
)
=
1
d
· exp
(
−n− `
n
√
bi
)
Now that we have analyzed the expected weight of the LP solutions x˜(`) in Lemma 6.1
and the resource consumption of previous rounds in Lemma 6.2, we can finally put the
pieces together. Based on these results, we can bound the expected value of the allocation y
computed by the algorithm.
Theorem 6.3. For online packing linear programs with column sparsity d and minimum capacity
bmin, Algorithm 8 is
(
1−O
(√
log d
bmin
))
-competitive in expectation, even with respect to the optimal
fractional solution.
Proof. We bound the expected objective value that Algorithm 8 obtains by summing over
its iterations. Although the algorithm treats every iteration identically, we will ignore the
outcomes of the first few rounds and of the last few rounds in the analysis. Let us consider
a fixed iteration ` with pn ≤ ` ≤ (1− p)n for p = 9
√
1+ln d
bmin
. Furthermore, let A` denote the
obtained objective value in this round. So A` is equal to cTx(`) if the tentative allocation x(`)
gets assigned permanently and zero otherwise.
To bound the expected value of A`, we will think of the random order with respect to
rounds 1, . . . , ` being determined in three steps:
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(i) First, it is determined which requests come within the first ` rounds by picking a ran-
dom set of cardinality ` from [n]. Their order is still undefined.
(ii) Second, one of these requests is selected uniformly at random to come in round `.
(iii) Finally, the order among the first `− 1 requests is determined.
Observe that, after step (i), the LP solution x˜(`) is already determined as it only depends on
the set of visible requests that appeared up to round `. Let OPT denote the objective value
of an optimal fractional solution to the full unscaled linear program maxx∈P(1,[n]) cTx. By
Lemma 6.1, we know that
E
[
cT x˜(`)
]
≥ `
n
·
(
1− 9
√
1+ ln d
`
n · bmin
)
OPT .
Then, after step (ii), x(`) is fixed as well. Since in this step one of the first ` requests is selected
uniformly at random, and by the definition of the randomized rounding, we have
E
[
cTx(`)
]
≥ 1
`
· E
[
cT x˜(`)
]
.
Step (iii) finally determines whether the allocation can actually be carried out, that is, if
y(`) = x(`). In Lemma 6.2, we have shown that, independent of the outcomes of steps (i)
and (ii), any constraint has remaining capacity less than one with probability at most 1d ·
exp
(− n−`n √bmin). Note that, by the assumption on the column sparsity, there are at most
d constraints that could possibly preclude a tentative allocation from becoming permanent.
Taking a union bound over all constraints having a non-zero entry, we get the probability
that the allocation can be carried out to be at least 1− exp (− n−`n √bmin).
Combining the above observations, we have
E [A`] ≥
(
1− exp
(
−n− `
n
√
bmin
))
· E
[
cTx(`)
]
≥
(
1− exp
(
−n− `
n
√
bmin
))
·
(
1− 9
√
1+ ln d
`
n · bmin
)
· OPT
n
.
The total objective value that Algorithm 8 obtains can be lower bounded by summing
over all iterations considered above. Hence, we get
E [ALG] ≥
(1−p)n
∑
`=pn
E [A`]
≥
(1−p)n
∑
`=pn
(
1− exp
(
−n− `
n
√
bmin
))
·
(
1− 9
√
1+ ln d
`
n · bmin
)
· OPT
n
≥
[
1− 2p−
(1−p)n
∑
`=pn
1
n
· exp
(
−n− `
n
√
bmin
)
−
(1−p)n
∑
`=pn
9
n
·
√
1+ ln d
`
n · bmin
]
·OPT .
We will analyze both negative sums separately and bound them by multiples of p.
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For the first sum, we reverse the order of summation and extend the sum to a geometric
series. Also using the inequality 1− exp(−x) ≥ (1− 1e ) · x for all 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, we obtain
(1−p)n
∑
`=pn
1
n
· exp
(
−n− `
n
√
bmin
)
≤ 1
n
·
∞
∑
i=0
exp
(
− i
n
√
bmin
)
=
1
n
·
∞
∑
i=0
exp
(
−
√
bmin
n
)i
=
1
n
(
1− exp
(
−
√
bmin
n
))
≤ 1(
1− 1e
)√
bmin
≤ p .
For the second sum, with the fact ∑n`=1
1√
`
≤ ∫ n0 x− 12 dx = 2√n, we have
(1−p)n
∑
`=pn
9
n
·
√
1+ ln d
`
n · bmin
≤ 9
√
1+ ln d
n · bmin ·
n
∑
`=1
1√
`
≤ 18
√
1+ ln d
bmin
≤ 2p .
Using the last two bounds, we obtain our final result on the expected competitiveness of
the algorithm.
E [ALG] ≥ (1− 5p) ·OPT
=
(
1− 45
√
1+ ln d
bmin
)
·OPT
=
(
1−O
(√
1+ log d
bmin
))
·OPT
In the above theorem, we showed that Algorithm 8 is
(
1−O
(√
log d
bmin
))
-competitive in
expectation on packing linear programs with column sparsity d and minimum capacity bmin.
In other words, the algorithm is (1− e)-competitive in expectation when the minimum ca-
pacity satisfies bmin = Ω
( log d
e2
)
.
Remember that the algorithm is invariant when scaling the constraints. Hence, we could
assume in the whole analysis that the maximum entry of every row in the constraint matrix
was one. Under this assumption, the minimum capacity was identical to the capacity ratio.
Thus, for general (unscaled) instances, Theorem 6.3 implies that Algorithm 8 is
(
1 −
O
(√
log d
B
))
-competitive in expectation, where B is the capacity ratio of the instance.
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6.1.2 Small Capacity Ratios
In the previous section, we analyzed the performance of Algorithm 8 for the case of high
capacity ratios and showed that it is (1− e)-competitive in expectation when the capacity
ratio satisfies B = Ω
( log d
e2
)
. However, if an instance has a small capacity ratio, there is no
e < 1 so that the algorithm is (1− e)-competitive. That is, the results of Section 6.1.1 are
not meaningful in this situation. Fortunately, our algorithm is very robust and does not only
give good results for high capacity ratios but also for small ones.
In this section, we show that Algorithm 8 performs favorably even for small capacity
ratios. Specifically, we prove that the online algorithm is Ω
( 1
d2/(B−1)
)
-competitive in expec-
tation for capacity ratios B ≥ 2. This is to be compared to the offline result by Bansal et
al. [BKNS12] who presented a randomized algorithm that gives a Ω( 1
d1/bBc
)-approximation
in expectation.
Again, without loss of generality, we assume that the instance is scaled, i. e., the maxi-
mum entry in every row of the constraint matrix is 1 and the capacity ratio is identical to the
minimum capacity bmin ≥ 2.
The general analysis will proceed similarly to the one for large capacities in Section 6.1.1.
We start by bounding the expected value of the scaled linear program in any round ` of the
algorithm. Lemma 6.4 is the analogous result to Lemma 6.1 but, in contrast to the analysis
there, we do not apply Chernoff bounds. This gives a considerably weaker result but a far
simpler proof.
Lemma 6.4. For any `, let S ⊆ [n] be a random subset of requests with |S| = `. Then, we have
E
[
max
x∈P( `n ,S)
cTx
]
≥
(
`
n
)2
· max
x∈P(1,[n])
cTx .
Proof. Let x∗ be an optimal fractional solution to the full unscaled LP maxx∈P(1,[n]) cTx. Based
on this vector, we will construct a feasible solution to the scaled and restricted linear program
maxx∈P(`/n,S) cTx and show that we only lose a factor of ( `n )
2. First, consider x′, the projection
of x∗ to the set of relevant requests S, by setting x′j,k := x
∗
j,k if j ∈ S and x′j,k := 0 otherwise.
Since every request j has probability `n of being in S, we have E
[
x′j,k
]
= `n · x∗j,k. To obtain
a feasible allocation, we also scale each variable by the factor `n , i. e., we set x
′′
j,k :=
`
n · x′j,k.
The restricted and scaled allocation vector x′′ now satisfies Ax′′ ≤ `n b and, hence, we have
x′′ ∈ P( `n , S). By linearity of expectation and since E
[
x′′j,k
]
= `n · E
[
x′j,k
]
= ( `n )
2 · x∗j,k, we
obtain
E
[
max
x∈P( `n ,S)
cTx
]
≥ E
[
cTx′′
]
=
(
`
n
)2
· cTx∗ .
Next, we prove an analogous result to Lemma 6.2 where we bound the probability
that the remaining capacities are high enough. Again, we apply a Chernoff bound for 1-
correlated random variables but in this case, since the capacities may be small, we use the
general version for arbitrary values δ > 0.
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Lemma 6.5. For bmin ≥ 2 define ψ := d
1
bmin−1 and consider any round ` with ` ≤ n4eψ . Let S ⊆ [n]
with |S| = ` − 1 be any set of ` − 1 requests and let ES be the event that the requests in S come
within the first `− 1 steps of the random input order. Then, conditioned on ES, the sum of previous
tentative allocations violate any constraint i ∈ [m] with probability at most
Pr
[(
∑
`′<`
Ax(`
′)
)
i
≥ bi − 1
∣∣∣∣∣ ES
]
≤ 1
2d
.
Proof. Exactly as in the proof of Lemma 6.2, we can show that the random variables X`′ :=
(Ax(`
′))i for `′ < ` are 1-correlated. Let us then apply the Chernoff bound of Panconesi and
Srinivasan [PS97] on the random variable ∑`′<` X`′ . Setting δ = 4eψ(1− 1bi )− 1, we obtain
bi − 1 = (1 + δ) · bi4eψ . And for the expected value of the sum of twin variables, we again
observe
E
[
∑
`′<`
Xˆ`′
∣∣∣∣∣ ES
]
=
`−1
∑
`′=1
bi
n
≤ `
n
bi ≤ bi4eψ .
Now, using Theorem A.2, we get for every δ > 0
Pr
[
∑
`′<`
X`′ ≥ bi − 1
∣∣∣∣∣ ES
]
= Pr
[
∑
`′<`
X`′ ≥ (1+ δ) · bi4eψ
]
≤
(
eδ
(1+ δ)(1+δ)
) bi
4eψ
≤
(
e
1+ δ
)(1+δ)· bi4eψ
.
Since bi ≥ 2, we have 1 + δ = 4eψ(1− 1bi ) ≥ 4eψ 12 = 2eψ, i. e., e1+δ ≤ 12ψ . By definition,
(1+ δ) · bi4eψ = bi − 1. Therefore,
(
e
1+ δ
)(1+δ)· bi4eψ
≤
(
1
2ψ
)bi−1
=
(
1
2
)bi−1
·
(
1
d
) bi−1
bmin−1 ≤ 1
2d
.
Finally, we can combine the previous lemmas to obtain an analogous result to Theo-
rem 6.3 that even holds for small capacities.
Theorem 6.6. For online packing linear programs with column sparsity d and minimum capacity
bmin ≥ 2, Algorithm 8 is Ω
( 1
d2/(bmin−1)
)
-competitive in expectation, even with respect to the optimal
fractional solution.
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 6.3, we bound the expected objective value that Algo-
rithm 8 obtains by summing over its iterations.
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Let us consider a fixed iteration ` with n8eψ ≤ ` ≤ n4eψ , where ψ = d
1
bmin−1 . Furthermore,
let A` denote the obtained objective value in this round, i. e., A` is cTx(`) if the tentative
allocation x(`) gets assigned permanently and zero otherwise.
To bound the expected value of A`, we will proceed as in the proof of Theorem 6.3.
Therefore, we think of the random order with respect to rounds 1, . . . , ` as being determined
in three steps:
(i) First, it is determined which requests come within the first ` rounds by picking a ran-
dom set of cardinality ` from [n].
(ii) Second, one of these requests is selected uniformly at random to come in round `.
(iii) Finally, the order among the first `− 1 requests is determined.
After step (i) the LP solution x˜(`) is already determined. Let OPT denote the objective value
of an optimal fractional solution to the full unscaled linear program maxx∈P(1,[n]) cTx. By
Lemma 6.4, we know that
E
[
cT x˜(`)
]
≥
(
`
n
)2
·OPT .
Then, after step (ii), x(`) is fixed as well. Since, in this step, one of the first ` requests is
selected uniformly at random and by the definition of the randomized rounding, we have
E
[
cTx(`)
]
≥ 1
`
· E
[
cT x˜(`)
]
≥ 1
`
·
(
`
n
)2
·OPT ≥ 1
8eψ
· OPT
n
.
Step (iii) finally determines whether the allocation can actually be carried out, that is, if y(`) =
x(`). By Lemma 6.5, and independent of the outcomes of steps (i) and (ii), any constraint has
remaining capacity less than one with probability at most 12d . So, by taking a union bound
over all relevant constraints – these are at most d – we see that the success probability of the
allocation is at least 12 .
Combining the above observations and summing over the considered rounds, we get
E [ALG] ≥
n
4eψ
∑
`= n8eψ
E [A`]
≥
n
4eψ
∑
`= n8eψ
1
2
· 1
8eψ
· OPT
n
≥
(
n
4eψ
− n
8eψ
)
1
2
· 1
8eψ
· OPT
n
=
1
128e2ψ2
·OPT = Ω
(
1
d
2
bmin−1
)
·OPT .
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6.2 Known Small Capacity Ratios
In Section 6.1.2 we analyzed the performance of Algorithm 8 for the case of small capacity
ratios. In particular, we showed that it is Ω
( 1
d2/(B−1)
)
-competitive in expectation for any ca-
pacity ratio B ≥ 2. A strong advantage of Algorithm 8 was that it did not need any prior
knowledge on the column sparsity d or the capacity ratio B of the instance at hand.
In this section we will improve the competitive ratio to Ω
( 1
d1/(B−1)
)
for the case that we do
know the parameters d and B of the instance. This is a reasonable assumption since in many
applications, like for example in auction settings, the maximum demands and the available
supplies are often known in advance. Observe that the obtained bound is surprisingly simi-
lar to the best offline approximation of Ω( 1
d1/bBc
) by Bansal et al. [BKNS12].
Remember that in Algorithm 8, all iterations were identical and even in the first rounds
a tentative allocation could possibly be made permanent. Especially in the case of small
capacities, this behavior may be a bit too optimistic since resources may be exhausted early.
Therefore, if we know B and d in advance, we can achieve a better competitive ratio by
adding a sampling phase at the start. Algorithm 9 is identical to Algorithm 8 except that it
does not make any allocation in the first pn rounds, where p = 1− 12e
( 1
2d
)1/(B−1).
Algorithm 9: Online packing LP with known parameters
Input : number of requests n, capacity vector b ∈ Rm≥0, column sparsity d, capacity
ratio B
Output: online solution vector y
Set p := 1− 12e
( 1
2d
)1/(B−1) and let S be the index set of the first pn requests;
Set y := 0;
for each arriving request j ∈ [n] \ S do // online steps ` = pn + 1 to n
Set S := S ∪ {j} and ` := |S|;
Let x˜(`) be an opt. fractional solution to the scaled LP relaxation maxx∈P( `n ,S) c
Tx;
Choose k(`) ∈ [K] where Pr
[
k(`) := k
]
= x˜(`)j,k and Pr
[
k(`) := ∅
]
= 1−∑k∈[K] x˜(`)j,k ;
Define x(`) with x(`)j′,k =
{
1, if j′ = j and k = k(`);
0, otherwise;
// tentative allocation
if A(y + x(`)) ≤ b then // feasibility test
Set y := y + x(`); // online allocation
The proof of the following result is very similar to the proof of Theorem 6.6 for unknown
parameters. We therefore only give a sketch of it.
Theorem 6.7. For online packing linear programs where the column sparsity d and capacity ratio
B ≥ 2 are known in advance, Algorithm 9 isΩ( 1
d1/(B−1)
)
-competitive in expectation, even with respect
to the optimal fractional solution.
Proof. We again assume without loss of generality that the instance is scaled such that the
capacity ratio B is equal to the minimum capacity bmin. To bound the expected value of any
tentative allocation, we can use the same argument as in Theorem 6.6. Since we sample the
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first pn requests, we only need to consider those rounds with ` > pn. For these, and as
p = 1− 12e
( 1
2d
)1/(B−1) ≥ 12 , we have
E
[
cTx(`)
]
≥ 1
`
·
(
`
n
)2
·OPT ≥ 1
2
· OPT
n
.
In order to analyze the probability of assigning a tentative allocation permanently, we
again apply the Chernoff bound of Theorem A.2 on the 1-correlated random variables X`′ :=
(Ax(`
′))i for `′ < `, like we did in Lemma 6.5. For the expected value of the sum of twin
variables, we observe
E
[
∑
`′<`
Xˆ`′
∣∣∣∣∣ ES
]
≤
`−1
∑
`′=pn+1
bi
n
≤ `− pn
n
bi ≤ (1− p)bi .
Setting δ = 1−1/bi1−p − 1, we obtain (1+ δ)(1− p)bi = bi − 1. Now, using the Chernoff bound,
we get for every δ > 0
Pr
[
∑
`′<`
X`′ ≥ bi − 1
∣∣∣∣∣ ES
]
= Pr
[
∑
`′<`
X`′ ≥ (1+ δ)(1− p)bi
]
≤
(
eδ
(1+ δ)(1+δ)
)(1−p)bi
≤
(
e
1+ δ
)(1+δ)(1−p)bi
=
(
e
1+ δ
)bi−1
.
Furthermore, by the definitions of δ and p, we have(
e
1+ δ
)bi−1
=
(
e(1− p)
1− 1bi
)bi−1
≤ (2e(1− p))bi−1
=
(
1
2d
) bi−1
B−1
≤ 1
2d
.
Now, to bound the success probability of assigning the tentative allocation x(`) permanently,
we can take a union bound over all constraints that have non-zero entries in the relevant
column. This shows that allocation is carried out with probability at least 12 .
Combining the above observations and summing over the considered rounds, we get
E [ALG] ≥
n
∑
`=pn+1
E [A`]
≥
n
∑
`=pn+1
1
2
· E
[
cTx(`)
]
≥ (1− p)n · 1
4
· OPT
n
=
1
8e(2d)
1
B−1
·OPT = Ω
(
1
d
1
B−1
)
·OPT .
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6.3 Truthful Mechanism
In the online model, we assume that, whenever a request arrives, we learn the request’s
columns in the constraint matrix and the corresponding coefficients of the objective func-
tion. Moreover, we expect that the provided information is correct. For many scenarios,
unfortunately, this assumption is not justified.
Often, the requests in our online model correspond to strategic agents who behave self-
ishly. This, for example, is the case for combinatorial auctions, where requests correspond
to bidders who have valuations for sets of items. The objective of every bidder is to ob-
tain a bundle that she values most. The algorithm, however, tries to maximize the social
welfare, i. e., the sum of the bidders’ valuations for their assigned sets. As the bidders are
egoistic, they have an incentive to lie about their true objective function and misreport their
valuations if this influences the algorithm in such a way that it assigns a preferred option.
Algorithmic mechanism design studies such scenarios where the input is provided by
selfish participants who want to maximize their personal utility (see the article by Nisan
in [NRTV07] for an introduction). The goal is to obtain globally desired outcomes although
the objectives of the individual participants might interfere with this. If the valuations can
be expressed in terms of money, the general approach is to provide not only an algorithm
but also influence the agents’ behavior by charging them prices for the outcome. Due to
the monetary fees, the agents will now try to maximize their individual utility which is the
valuation for the outcome minus the price they have to pay for it. By setting the prices
carefully, it is often possible to make sure that it is in the best interest of every agent to report
her valuations correctly.
Let us introduce some fundamental terms to describe the setting. There are n agents and
a set of possible outcomes A. For every agent j ∈ [n], her preferences over the outcomes
are given by a valuation function vj : A → R≥0. We denote the set of possible valuation
functions for j by Vj. A mechanism is a tuple ( f , p1, . . . , pn) that consists of a social choice
function f : V1 × · · · × Vn → A and a payment function pj : V1 × · · · × Vn → R for every
bidder j. It works as follows. First, each agent j reports a valuation function vj. These
might possibly differ from the agent’s true valuations. Then, an outcome a = f (v1, . . . , vn)
is computed by the social choice function and each agent j is charged a price pj(v1, . . . , vn).
The utility of every agent j is given by vj(a)− pj(v1, . . . , vn), the difference of the valuation
for the outcome and the price for it. The selfish agents will try to maximize their utility by
reporting valuations strategically.
A deterministic mechanism ( f , p1, . . . , pn) is called truthful if the agents maximize their
respective utilities by reporting the true valuation functions. More formally, let vˆj denote the
true valuation function of agent j. Then, a mechanism is truthful if, for every j ∈ [n], every
vˆj, vj ∈ Vj and every v−j ∈ V1 × · · · ×Vj−1 ×Vj+1 × · · · ×Vn, we have
vˆj( f (vˆj, v−j))− pj(vˆj, v−j) ≥ vˆj( f (vj, v−j))− pj(vj, v−j) .
Our mechanism is not deterministic and we therefore resort to the following different
notion of truthfulness.
A randomized mechanism ( f , p1, . . . , pn) is called truthful in expectation if the agents max-
imize their expected utility by reporting the true valuation functions. Again, let vˆj denote
the true valuation function of agent j. Then, a mechanism is truthful in expectation if, for
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every j ∈ [n], every vˆj, vj ∈ Vj and every v−j ∈ V1 × · · · ×Vj−1 ×Vj+1 × · · · ×Vn, we have
E
[
vˆj( f (vˆj, v−j))− pj(vˆj, v−j)
] ≥ E [vˆj( f (vj, v−j))− pj(vj, v−j)] .
Here, the expectation is over the random choices in the algorithm and the random input
order.
In our setting, the possible outcomes correspond to the feasible integral solutions to the
linear packing program. The valuation function of a request is given by the coefficients in
the objective function for the respective columns. A strategic request might misreport these
values if this improves the chances of getting assigned a preferred option.
The presented mechanism is almost identical to Algorithm 8. Remember that in Algo-
rithm 8, a tentative assignment was allocated only if it was feasible with respect to the re-
maining capacities of every constraint. That means, there, a request would potentially be
better off by reporting no valuation for infeasible options in the first place. Our mechanism
prevents this behavior by initially removing all infeasible options. Specifically, this is done
by setting their coefficients in the objective function to zero. Then, the algorithm proceeds ex-
actly as Algorithm 8, with the one exception that the final feasibility test can now be omitted.
Every online request is charged a price which is defined by the classic VCG payment rule
(see [NRTV07]), i. e., each participant is charged the harm that it causes to the other partici-
pants. Specifically, we use a technique by Lavi and Swamy [LS11] and compute VCG prices
on the domain of fractional allocations where an optimal solution can be found efficiently.
Algorithm 10: Truthful online packing LP
Input : number of requests n, capacity vector b ∈ Rm≥0
Output: online solution vector y
Let S := ∅ be the index set of known requests;
Set y := 0;
for each arriving request j ∈ [n] \ S do // online steps ` = 1 to n
Set S := S ∪ {j} and ` := |S|;
for each option k such that ∃i ∈ [m] with (Ay)i + ai,j,k > bi do
Set cj,k = 0; // remove infeasible options
Let x˜(`) be an opt. fractional solution to the scaled LP relaxation maxx∈P( `n ,S) c
Tx;
Charge VCG payment pj = max
x∈P( `n ,S\{j})
cTx− ∑
j′∈S\{j},k∈[K]
cj′,k · x˜(`)j′,k;
Choose k(`) ∈ [K] where Pr
[
k(`) := k
]
= x˜(`)j,k and Pr
[
k(`) := ∅
]
= 1−∑k∈[K] x˜(`)j,k ;
Define x(`) with x(`)j′,k =
{
1, if j′ = j and k = k(`);
0, otherwise;
// tentative allocation
Set y := y + x(`); // online allocation
When a request arrives, we can admit that it knows which other requests have appeared
before him. Hence, from its point of view, the only nondeterministic event is the randomized
rounding in its iteration. The order of the remaining requests is irrelevant for the current
step. That is, when a strategic request tries to maximizes its expected utility, the expectation
is over the random choice in the randomized rounding.
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Theorem 6.8. The mechanism is truthful in expectation even when the random input order is known
in advance.
Proof. Consider any iteration ` of Algorithm 10 with online request j and let S with |S| = `
be the set of visible requests. Let (cˆj,k)k∈[K] denote j’s true valuations for its options and let
(cj,k)k∈[K] be the reported ones.
The algorithm computes a fractional optimal solution x˜(`) to the scaled linear program
maxx∈P( `n ,S) c
Tx and selects an option k(`) ∈ [K] by randomly rounding this fractional allo-
cation of request j. Additionally, the mechanism charges the payment pj. Hence, the utility
for request j in this case is cˆj,k(`) − pj.
Observe that any chosen option can always be assigned successfully since infeasible op-
tions were already removed in advance. By the definition of the randomized rounding and
since pj is independent of it, the expected utility for request j satisfies
E
[
cˆj,k(`) − pj
]
= E
[
∑
k∈[K]
cˆj,k · x(`)j,k
]
− pj = ∑
k∈[K]
cˆj,k · x˜(`)j,k − pj .
Inserting the definition of the price pj, we have
E
[
cˆj,k(`) − pj
]
= ∑
k∈[K]
cˆj,k · x˜(`)j,k −
 max
x∈P( `n ,S\{j})
cTx− ∑
j′∈S\{j},k∈[K]
cj′,k · x˜(`)j′,k

=
 ∑
k∈[K]
cˆj,k · x˜(`)j,k + ∑
j′∈S\{j},k∈[K]
cj′,k · x˜(`)j′,k
− max
x∈P( `n ,S\{j})
cTx .
The negative term in the last line does not depend on the reported valuations of request j.
The fractional allocation x˜(`) maximizes the objective function ∑j∈S, k∈[K] cj,k · xj,k subject to
x ∈ P( `n , S). Hence, the request j maximizes its expected utility by reporting the valuations
cj,k := cˆj,k to the algorithm.
Theorem 6.9. For online packing linear programs with m constraints and minimum capacity bmin,
the mechanism described in Algorithm 10 is
(
1 − O
(√
log m
bmin
))
-competitive in expectation given
truthful reports, even with respect to the optimal fractional solution.
Proof. Like in the proof of Theorem 6.3, we consider the contribution to the objective function
of a fixed iteration ` with pn ≤ ` ≤ (1− p)n for p = 9
√
1+ln m
bmin
. Let F be the event that
(∑`′<` Ax(`
′))i ≤ bi − 1 is fulfilled for all i ∈ [m]. Observe that as long as F holds, the
algorithm’s behavior in round ` does not differ from the one of Algorithm 8. Let z(`) be the
random variable indicating the tentative allocation in a run of Algorithm 8.
For all a > 0, we now have
Pr
[
cTx(`) ≥ a
]
≥ Pr [F ] · Pr
[
cTx(`) ≥ a
∣∣∣ F]
= Pr [F ] · Pr
[
cTz(`) ≥ a
∣∣∣ F]
= Pr
[
cTz(`) ≥ a
]
· Pr
[
F
∣∣∣ cTz(`) ≥ a] .
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In the proof of Theorem 6.3, we have shown E
[
cTz(`)
]
≥ 1n
(
1− 9
√
1+ln m
`/n·bmin
)
OPT. Fur-
thermore, Lemma 6.2 shows that Pr
[
F
∣∣∣ cTz(`) ≥ a] ≥ 1− exp(− n−`n √bmin). In combina-
tion, we get
E
[
cTx(`)
]
≥ OPT
n
(
1− 9
√
1+ ln m
`
n · bmin
)
·
(
1− exp
(
−n− `
n
√
bmin
))
.
The remaining calculations can be carried out exactly as in the proof of Theorem 6.3.
By an analogous adaptation of Theorem 6.6, we can show:
Theorem 6.10. For online packing linear programs with m constraints and minimum capacity
bmin ≥ 2, the mechanism described in Algorithm 10 is Ω
( 1
m2/(bmin−1)
)
-competitive in expectation
given truthful reports, even with respect to the optimal fractional solution.
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CHAPTER 7
Conclusion and Further Work
We have presented online algorithms for combinatorial generalizations of the famous sec-
retary problem. In particular, we considered various different optimization problems of
packing type and showed new and improved competitive ratios in the random-order online
model. This input model bridges the gap between the classic adversarial online model and
the offline model. Specifically, in the random-order model, an adversary generates an input
sequence in advance which then is presented to the algorithm in random-permutation order.
This is a relaxation of the classic online model, where the arrival order of the input sequence
is determined by the adversary.
To name only two major results, we presented the first optimal online algorithms for the
edge-weighted bipartite matching problem and for packing linear programs. In the case of
the online matching problem, our algorithm has an expected competitive ratio of 1e . This
matches the best-possible competitive ratio for the secretary problem and, hence, extends
classic results to the combinatorial setting. As a byproduct, this also gives the best-possible
competitive ratio for the matroid secretary problem on transversal matroids, which is a spe-
cial case of weighted bipartite matching. Second, for online packing LPs, we presented a
simple algorithm that is (1− e)-competitive in expectation when the capacity ratio B satis-
fies B = Ω
( log d
e2
)
, where d is the column sparsity of the instance. This result matches known
lower bounds and is therefore best-possible. Furthermore, the given algorithm is very ro-
bust in the sense that it does not need to know the capacity ratio or column sparsity of the
instance in advance and we can even bound its competitiveness when the capacity ratio is
small. In addition to the two mentioned results, we also obtained improvements for combi-
natorial auctions with various types of valuation functions, for the generalized assignment
problem and for packing LPs in some special settings.
The crucial idea in all our proofs is the reinterpretation of the random input order as
a particular sequence of stochastically independent random choices. This decomposition
technique is the key to bound the expected performance of our algorithms. Since the decom-
position approach is very general, it might also help to improve the understanding of other
optimization problems in the random-order model.
Although we presented best-possible results for some of the considered problems, there
is still room for improvement or further generalization. These include applicability, possible
improvements of the competitive ratios or extensions to other online models.
For practical applications, the runtime of the algorithms is of great importance. The al-
gorithms proposed here always compute an optimal fractional solution in every online iter-
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ation. Using the ellipsoid method, this is possible in polynomial time but generally imprac-
tical. To avoid superfluous computation by starting anew in each round, it may be helpful
to rather modify the optimal solution of a previous iteration. Often, the optimality of the
local solution can be maintained by only applying minor changes while the instance grows
from round to round. In the case of the edge-weighted matching problem, for example, this
approach gives a significant speedup. An alternative is to always compute approximate so-
lutions by combinatorial approximation algorithms. This results in faster algorithms while
losing only the additional approximation factor.
Another interesting field are even more general optimization problems in the random-
order model. While in the problems considered here, the objective function was always
linear, one could conceive non-linear functions. Examples are various types of concave or
submodular objective functions.
It remains open whether the results on truthful mechanisms for online packing LPs can
be extended to settings where the capacity ratio is smaller than two. Namely, for the case
of edge-weighted bipartite matching, it is an interesting and very important open question
to find a constant-competitive truthful mechanism. Another challenge is to develop mech-
anisms that guarantee stronger notions of truthfulness. While in our case, the participants
report truthfully if they want to maximize their expected utility, one could ask for a univer-
sally truthful mechanism where they report correctly for any random outcome.
A different research direction is to compare the results for the random-order model to
other online models where the power of the classic adversary is restricted. It is known, for
example, that all results for the random-order model also hold for the i.i.d. model. There,
the input at every online step is sampled independently from an identical distribution. In
other models of interest one could, for example, allow the online algorithm to make minor
corrections to previous decisions, which is a reasonable assumption for some applications.
Or one could assume a random-order model where the input order is not chosen among all
possible permutations but only among a subset of permutations.
Finally, a classic and long-standing open problem in the random-order online model is
the matroid secretary problem on general matroids. For several special types of matroids,
constant-competitive algorithms have been found, like, e. g., for uniform, transversal or
graphic matroids. It is conjectured that this is also possible for general matroids. How-
ever, no constant-competitive algorithm is known. The techniques presented in this thesis
might shade some light on possible approaches.
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Appendix – Chernoff Bounds
The well-known Chernoff bounds are a powerful tool to bound the deviation probability of
random variables from their mean. In the classic version, they apply to sums of independent
Poisson trials and provide an exponentially decreasing bound on the tail distribution.
The statement for the deviation above the mean is given in Theorem A.1. Further de-
tails can be found in the textbooks by Dubhashi and Panconesi [DP09], Mitzenmacher and
Upfal [MU05] or Williamson and Shmoys [WS11].
Theorem A.1. Let X1, . . . , Xn be independent binary random variables such that, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we
have Xi ∈ {0, ai}, where 0 < ai ≤ 1. Let X = ∑ni=1 Xi and µ ≥ E [X]. Then, for every δ > 0, we
have
Pr [X ≥ (1+ δ)µ] ≤
(
eδ
(1+ δ)(1+δ)
)µ
.
For the proof of the above theorem, it is very important that the random variables are
independent. Panconesi and Srinivasan [PS97] showed that this assumption is not always
necessary. They introduced the notion of λ-correlatedness and gave a Chernoff-style result
under these weaker conditions. In fact, their result even holds for non-binary bounded ran-
dom variables.
Definition A.1 ([PS97]). Let X1, . . . , Xn be random variables with Xi ∈ [0, 1]. These variables are
λ-correlated if there exist independent twin variables Xˆ1, . . . , Xˆn with Xˆi ∈ [0, 1] such that
(i) E [∑ni=1 Xi] ≤ E
[
∑ni=1 Xˆi
]
and
(ii) for all I ⊆ [n] and positive integers si, i ∈ I,
E
[
∏
i∈I
Xsii
]
≤ λ · E
[
∏
i∈I
Xˆsii
]
.
Under these weaker conditions, they obtained a concentration bound that we apply in
the proof of Lemma 6.1 and Lemma 6.2. For the sake of completeness, we also give the proof.
Theorem A.2 ([PS97]). Let X1, . . . , Xn be λ-correlated random variables with Xi ∈ [0, 1] and let
Xˆ1, . . . , Xˆn be their corresponding twin variables. Let X = ∑ni=1 Xi, Xˆ = ∑
n
i=1 Xˆi and µ ≥ E
[
Xˆ
]
.
Then, for every δ > 0, we have
Pr
[
n
∑
i=1
Xi ≥ (1+ δ)µ
]
≤ λ ·
(
eδ
(1+ δ)(1+δ)
)µ
.
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Proof. Like in the standard proof of Theorem A.1, we consider the random variable etX for
any parameter t > 0 and obtain
Pr [X ≥ (1+ δ)µ] = Pr
[
etX ≥ et(1+δ)µ
]
.
Using Markov’s inequality (Pr [Y ≥ a] ≤ E[Y]a for any non-negative random variable Y), we
get
Pr
[
etX ≥ et(1+δ)µ
]
≤ E
[
etX
]
et(1+δ)µ
.
Now, we can analyze the numerator by expanding the exponential function and applying
linearity of expectation. Note that the last step is possible for the infinite sum since X is
bounded,
E
[
etX
]
= E
[
∞
∑
k=0
tk · Xk
k!
]
=
∞
∑
k=0
tk · E [Xk]
k!
.
Using the multinomial expansion Xk = (∑ni=1 Xi)
k = ∑s1+...+sn=k
k!
s1! ··· sn ! ∏
n
i=1 X
si
i together
with the linearity of expectation and the second property of λ-correlatedness, we obtain
E
[
Xk
] ≤ λ · E [Xˆk]. Applying this to the last equation, we have
E
[
etX
]
≤ λ ·
∞
∑
k=0
tk · E [Xˆk]
k!
= λ · E
[
etXˆ
]
.
Now, since the Xˆi are independent, we get
E
[
etXˆ
]
= E
[
et∑
n
i=1 Xˆi
]
= E
[
n
∏
i=1
etXˆi
]
=
n
∏
i=1
E
[
etXˆi
]
.
To analyze the factors E
[
etXˆi
]
, first observe that the exponential function is convex. Hence,
for a fixed t and for Xˆi ∈ [0, 1], we can bound the exponential function from above by a linear
function, i. e., etXˆi ≤ (et − 1) · Xˆi + 1. This, along with the fact x + 1 ≤ ex for any x, gives
E
[
etXˆi
]
≤ E [(et − 1) · Xˆi + 1] = (et − 1) · E [Xˆi]+ 1 ≤ e(et−1)·E[Xˆi ] .
Combining the last two equations, we obtain
E
[
etXˆ
]
≤
n
∏
i=1
e(e
t−1)·E[Xˆi ] = e(e
t−1)·∑ni=1 E[Xˆi ] = e(e
t−1)·E[Xˆ] ≤ e(et−1)µ ,
where we used the fact E
[
Xˆ
] ≤ µ. Finally, setting t = ln(1+ δ), we have
Pr [X ≥ (1+ δ)µ] ≤
λ · E
[
etXˆ
]
et(1+δ)µ
≤ λ · e
(et−1)µ
et(1+δ)µ
= λ ·
(
eδ
(1+ δ)(1+δ)
)µ
.
Chernoff Bounds 73
Using standard calculus, it is in some cases possible to simplify the rather complicated
expression in Theorem A.2. In particular, for 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, the inequality(
eδ
(1+ δ)(1+δ)
)µ
≤ e− δ23 µ (A.1)
holds. Although it results in a weaker statement, we will use this simplified version of
Theorem A.2 in the proof of Lemma 6.1 and Lemma 6.2 since it is easier to handle. We omit
the proof of inequality (A.1) as it can be found in each of the mentioned textbooks.
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